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Environmental Damages after the
Federal Environmental Enforcement
Act: Bringing Ecosystem Services to
Canadian Environmental Law?
MARTIN Z.P. OLSZYNSKI *
The Canadian Environmental Enforcement Act [EEA] directs judges to consider actual environmental damage, or risk thereof, when setting fines for environmental offences. The EEA
defines damage as including the loss of use and non-use values. While these terms are not
unprecedented in Canadian environmental law, their use in environmental damage assessment
is. Bearing in mind recent developments in environmental valuation in the United States
and internationally, and considering the emergence of the “ecosystem services” paradigm
in particular, this article explores the opportunities and challenges for ecosystem servicesbased environmental damages assessment in the Canadian environmental sentencing context.
The ecosystem services concept, much written about in American legal literature, provides
a framework for identifying and organizing the numerous direct and indirect contributions
that ecosystems make to human well-being, the value of which can then be expressed in
economic terms. Although novel and ambitious in some respects, this approach would be
consistent with both Parliament’s intention in passing the EEA and with the pre-existing
common law framework for environmental sentencing in Canada.
Le Parlement canadien a récemment adopté la Loi sur le contrôle d’application de lois environnementales [LCALE], qui ordonne aux juges de considérer les dommages environnementaux
réels, ou le risque de ces derniers, lors de la détermination des amendes relatives à des
infractions environnementales. La LCALE définit expressément les dommages comme incluant
la valeur de la perte de jouissance et de non usage et, bien que ces termes ne soient pas
sans précédent dans le droit de l’environnement canadien, leur évaluation actuelle l’est. En
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gardant à l’esprit les récents développements de l’évaluation environnementale aux ÉtatsUnis et sur la scène internationale, et en considérant en particulier l’émergence du modèle
des « services écosystémiques », cet article se penche sur les occasions et les défis de
l’évaluation des dommages environnementaux axée sur les services écosystémiques dans
le contexte de la détermination des peines environnementales au Canada. Le concept des
services écosystémiques, très présent dans la documentation juridique américaine, fournit
un cadre pour l’identification et l’organisation des nombreux apports directs et indirects que
les écosystèmes procurent pour le bien-être des humains; la valeur de ces apports peut alors
s’exprimer en termes économiques. Bien que cette approche soit novatrice et ambitieuse à
certains égards, elle serait conforme à l’intention du Parlement lors de son adoption de la
LCALE et au cadre préexistant de la common law relativement aux peines environnementales
au Canada.
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ON 18 JUNE 2009, Canada’s Parliament passed the government-sponsored

Environmental Enforcement Act [EEA].1 This “sweeping”2 and lengthy omnibus
legislation contained numerous amendments to the enforcement, offence, penalty,
and sentencing provisions of nine different federal environmental statutes,
including Canada’s flagship environmental protection legislation, the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999.3 It establishes new minimum and higher
maximum fines, requires fines to be doubled for second and subsequent offences,
and directs all fines to be paid to a specified government account, the Environmental Damages Fund (EDF). It also requires courts to add any profits gained
1.
2.

3.

SC 2009, c 14 [EEA]. The EEA received royal assent on 18 June 2009.
House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 31 (23 March 2009) at 1823 (Mark
Warawa) [House of Commons Debates]; and House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No
31 (23 March 2009) at 1826) (David McGuinty).
SC 1999, c 33 [CEPA, 1999]. The full list of amended statues can be found in Part II B,
below.
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in the commission of an offence to the amount of fines ordered, and requires
corporations to disclose details of any convictions to their shareholders.4
Of all these amendments, the changes to the sentencing provisions have
the most potential to transform not only environmental sentencing, but also
Canadian environmental law generally. When all of the EEA’s provisions are
implemented, judges setting fines for an offence under any of the nine statutes
will be required to consider whether, in the commission of that offence, the
accused “caused damage or risk of damage” to some aspect of the environment.5
Damage is defined as including “the loss of use value and non-use value.”6
Admittedly, there is nothing ground-breaking about judges taking into
account the actual and potential environmental harm caused by an offender
in determining the appropriate fine; these have long been relevant, if inexact,
considerations in Canadian environmental sentencing law.7 Nor are the terms
“use-value” and “non-use value” unprecedented in Canada. The Ontario Law
Reform Commission first advocated their potential role in civil liability for environmental damages in 1990.8 More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada
opened the door for governments to sue for loss of such values in Canadian Forest
Products v British Columbia (Canfor).9 In that case, the defendant company was
found liable for negligently failing to extinguish a control burn. The provincial
Crown sought both commercial damages (for lost stumpage revenue) and compensation for environmental damages, identifying three components of such loss:
“Use value” includes the services provided by the ecosystem to human beings,
including food sources, water quality and recreational opportunities.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary: Bill C-16:
Environmental Enforcement Act by Penny Becklumb (Ottawa: Library of Parliament,
2009) [Parliamentary Information and Research Service]. See also Environment Canada,
Backgrounder: Overview of the Environmental Enforcement Bill (3 March 2009), online:
Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca> [Backgrounder].
See e.g. Migratory Birds Convention Act, SC 1994, c 22, s 13.1 (2)(b) & s 13.1(4) [MBCA]
(as amended by the Environmental Enforcement Act, not yet proclaimed into force). See supra
note 1.
Ibid.
R v United Keno Hill Mines Ltd, [1980] 1 YJ 299 at para 13, 5 WCB 467 [United Keno Hill].
This case and others are further discussed in Part II, below.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Damages for Environmental Harm (Toronto:
Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1990) [OLRC Report].
2004 SCC 38, 2 SCR 74 [Canfor]. See Jerry V DeMarco, Marcia Valiante & Marie-Anne
Bowden, “Opening the Door for Common Law Environmental Protection in Canada: The
Decision in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd.” (2005) 15:2 J Envtl L & Prac 233.
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“Passive use” or “existence” [non-use] value recognizes that a member of the public
may be prepared to pay something for the protection of a natural resource, even if he
or she never directly uses it … .
Finally, an ecosystem may be said to have an “inherent value” beyond its usefulness
to humans. … [T]o the extent humans recognize this inherent value, and are willing
to forego income or wealth for it, it becomes a part of passive [non] use value and
becomes compensable.10

In Canfor, however, British Columbia failed to adduce any evidence of
loss of these values. Thus, while recognizing that “our environment is an
asset of superordinate importance”11 and leaving it open to both the federal and
provincial Crown to prove environmental harm in a future case, the Court
dismissed this part of the claim, considering it “neither appropriate nor necessary
to pronounce on the specific methodology that could be employed in valuation
of environmental losses.”12
At the time, Canfor was described as the latest in a series of cases “to chart
a positive future for environmental law in Canada.”13 In the years since its
release, however, little progress appears to have been made. The case has been
cited numerous times by various courts, but no government litigant has taken up
the task of environmental valuation for the purposes of environmental damages
assessment.14 What commentators described as “a significant step”15 and a “potential … watershed”16 has thus far been a mere trickle, barely meeting the Court’s
own assessment of an “incremental” development in the common law.17 As a
result, many environmental harms continue to be externalized.18
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Canfor, supra note 9 at para 138.
Ibid at para 135.
Ibid at para 153.
DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 233.
Of the 26 times Canfor has been reported as being cited, only two cases have been concerned
with environmental damages, and only in a limited way. See Bérubé c Savard, 2006 QCCQ
2077 at paras 20-27, [2006] RDI 356; and Westside Transport Inc v Continental Insurance Co,
2004 BCSC 1195 at para 56, 36 BCLR (4th) 387.
Stewart AG Elgie & Antasia M Lintner, “The Supreme Court’s Canfor Decision: Losing The
Battle But Winning The War For Environmental Damages” (2005) 37:1 UBC L Rev 223 at 260.
DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 255.
Canfor, supra note 9 at para 155.
See DeMarco, Valiante & Bowden, supra note 9 at 238. They observe that, “[f ]or instance,
a corporation that avails itself of tax incentives and inexpensive access to public resources …
may be able to justify a particular development project from the perspective of its bottomline even if the net effect of the development on society may actually be negative. Economists
often speak of interests that have been externalized from the decision in question.” See also
Elgie & Lintner, supra note 15 at 229.
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The inclusion of use and non-use values in the EEA presents an opportunity
to pick up where Canfor left off, especially when one considers that there were
over five hundred convictions under the laws amended by the EEA in the five
years preceding its passage.19 While not all of these would have involved environmental harm or even the risk thereof, several recent and high profile incidents,
such as the prosecution of Canadian oil sands company Syncrude after approximately 1,500 ducks died in one of its tailings ponds, suggest that the EEA could
spur some activity on this front.20
Environmental valuation was traditionally an economist’s game.21 American
lawyers and judges began to enter the fray following the 1980 passage of the
Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA,
also known as Superfund).22 Ecologists started to get involved in valuation activity
in the last two decades, and their work only began gaining wider acceptance at
the time that Canfor was decided.23 They began by analogizing ecosystem structure
and function to capital, as understood in economics to be the stock that “gives
rise to the flow of ecosystem goods and services.”24 Recognizing that society’s
19. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1824 (Mark Warawa).
20. R v Syncrude Canada Ltd, 2010 ABPC 229, 53 CELR (3d) 196 [Syncrude]. The company
was found guilty of depositing a substance harmful to migratory birds, contrary to subsection
5.1(1) of the MBCA, 1995.
21. Wiktor L Adamowicz, “What’s it worth? An examination of historical trends and future
directions in environmental valuation” (2004) 48:3 Austl J of Agric Resource Econ 419. See
also WM Hanemann, “The economic conception of water” in Peter P Rogers, M Ramón
Llamas & Luis Martinez-Cortina, eds, Water Crisis: myth or reality? (London: Taylor &
Francis, 2006) 61 at 67.
22. 42 USC § 9601 (1980) [CERCLA]. Under CERCLA, natural resource damages are
recoverable by federal and state governments, as well as Indian tribes, for damages caused
by the release of hazardous substances. CERCLA is also known as Superfund because of
the creation of a special fund for the immediate clean up of the most contaminated sites
with provisions for cost-recovery later. Most of the American legal scholarship in this area
has focused on the evidentiary suitability of various non-market valuation techniques, and
especially contingent valuation (CV). See Damage Assessment Remediation and Restoration
Program, Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation by Kenneth Arrow et al
(Silver Spring: NOAA Office of Response & Restoration, 1993); Frank B Cross, “Restoring
Restoration For Natural Resource Damages” (1993) 24:2 U Tol L Rev 319 at 321; Brian
R Binger, Robert F Copple & Elizabeth Hoffman, “The Use Of Contingent Valuation
Methdology In Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction”
(1995) 89:3 Nw UL Rev at 1030-31.
23. The term “ecologists” is intended to include ecological economists and the field of ecological
economics.
24. JB Ruhl, Steven E Kraft & Christopher L Lant, The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services
(Washington: Island Press, 2007) at 17.
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near total ignorance of its dependence on these services represented a “major
hindrance” to the formulation and implementation of effective environmental
policy,25 this group then took it upon itself to not only assess the numerous
services provided by nature but also to provide an estimate of their economic
value. The first study to do this on a global scale estimated the value of seventeen
ecosystem services, such as gas and water regulation, at thirty-three trillion dollars
(US) per year.26 And while the initial approaches were marked by a high degree
of uncertainty,27 the ensuing “explosion of interest”28 has resulted in “tremendous
advancements.”29
This is not to suggest that ecosystem services theory has completely displaced
conventional environmental economics, or that it is an environmental policy
panacea.30 It is, however, the conceptual framework under which valuation (and
environmental decision making generally) is increasingly being carried out:
“From their origins as an obscure phrase just nine years ago, ‘ecosystem services’
have gone mainstream, with new initiatives … blossoming around the world,”31
25. Gretchen Daily, ed, Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Washington:
Island Press, 1997) at xv.
26. Robert Costanza et al, “The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital”
(1997) 387 Nature 253 at 253. For comparison, the global GNP at this time was
approximately eighteen trillion (US dollars) per year.
27. Costanza et al listed 12 sources of error and uncertainty in their study. See ibid at 258.
While lauding the effort, their approach was also criticized by several economists. See e.g.
David Pearce, “Auditing the Earth: The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital” (1998) 40:2 Environment 23 at 23-28.
28. JB Ruhl & James Salzman, “The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services” (2007)
22:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 157 at 157.
29. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 9. The authors observe that “[t]remendous
advancement has been made in the past decade towards improving our understanding of the
ecological dynamics of ecosystem services, their geographic distribution across landscapes,
and their economic value to human communities.” See also Kate A Brauman et al, “The
Nature and Value of Ecosystem Services: An Overview Highlighting Hydrologic Services”
(2007) 32 Ann Rev Envtl Res 67 at 68.
30. Environmental valuation generally and ecosystem services specifically both have their fair
share of detractors. See e.g. Morgan M Roberton, “The neoliberalization of ecosystem
services: wetland mitigation banking and the problem of measurement” in Nick Heynen
et al, eds, Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences (Routledge:
New York, 2007) at 114. Richard B Norgaard, “Ecosystem services: From eye-opening
metaphor to complexity Blinder” (2010) 69:6 Ecological Econ 1219; Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection”
(2002) 150:5 U Pa L Rev 1553; Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and
the Environment, 2d (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
31. James Salzman, “Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field” (2005)
80:3 NYUL Rev 870 at 873.
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including in Australia, Costa Rica, and most recently in Norway and the United
Kingdom.32 Of particular relevance to this article, the Science Advisory Board on
Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services (EPA Science Advisory
Board [EPA-SAB] created by the US Environmental Protection Agency in 2003)
recently released a report suggesting inter alia that an ecosystem services approach
“would enhance the ability … to assess injury, define restoration goals, and
calculate damages” under CERCLA.33 In fact, regulations under both that statute
and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)34 have long relied on the ‘services’ provided by
natural resources as their metric for damages,35 reference to which can be found
in the United States’ recent complaint against BP Global and others following
the August 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.36
The purpose of this article is to assess the potential for an ecosystem services
approach to environmental damages assessment (EDA) in the post-EEA world.
Part I begins with a primer on ecosystem services theory. While research into
ecosystem services in Canada dates back to at least 2004,37 and the term has even
32. See Alister Doyle, “Norway index gauges nature; may bring GDP rethink”, Reuters
(21 October 2010) online: Reuters < http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/
idINIndia-52362320101021>. Doyle notes, “An index to judge the state of Norway’s
nature is a world first that may be a step towards valuing ‘free’ services such as insect
pollination or forest growth in a radical shift in economics, officials say.” The UK released
the findings of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA), which “represents a
first attempt to assess our stocks of natural ecosystem resources, their state and the trends
in their development.” See UK National Ecosystem Assessment, The UK National Ecosystem
Assessment: Synthesis of the Key Findings, UNEP-WCMC (Cambridge: 2011) at 4, online:
<http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.asp>.
33. United States, United Stated Environmental Protection Agency, Valuing the Protection of
Ecological Systems and Services: A Report of the EPA Science Advisory Board (Washington, DC:
Science Advisory Board, 2009) at 95 [EPA]. See also Wayne R Munns Jr et al, “Translating
Ecological Risk to Ecosystem Service Loss” (2009) 5:4 500 at 501. Other American
initiatives include the creation of the Office of Environmental Markets (OEM), formerly
the Office of Ecosystem Services and Markets, established under the US Department of
Agriculture in December 2008. The change in name does not appear to have changed the
Office’s mandate. See United States Department of Agriculture, News Release, No 0115.10
(Washington, DC: Office of Communications, 10 March 2010).
34. 33 USC § 2701 (1990) [OPA].
35. For the CERCLA, see 43 CFR § 11. For the OPA, see 15 CFR § 990 (2011).
36. See United States of America v BP Exploration & Production Inc (Complaint) at para 66,
online: <http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Environmental%20Law/
USDOJ%20BP%20Complaint.pdf >. (Stating that “[d]ischarged oil and some of the
response activities to address the discharges of oil have resulted in injury to, loss of, loss of
use of or destruction of natural resources in and around the Gulf of Mexico … and also have
impaired or caused the loss of services that those resources provide”).
37. See e.g. Nature Conservancy of Canada, The Value of Natural Capital in Settled Areas of
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made its way into government documents and policies,38 the concept has received
limited treatment in Canadian legal literature—especially when compared to the
American scholarship.39 This Part also surveys some of the approaches for ecosystem services assessment and valuation that have been developed and applied
under the American natural resources damages assessment (NRDA) legislation.
Part II examines the relevant EEA provisions against the background of the existing
common law framework for environmental sentencing in order to identify and
assess the opportunities and challenges for integrating ecosystem services in that
context. The article concludes by suggesting that while novel and ambitious, an
ecosystem services approach to EDA is particularly well-suited for meeting Parliament’s objectives in passing the EEA. An ecosystem services approach would also
point Canadian environmental law more firmly in what is widely regarded as its
necessary direction: towards “recogniz[ing] … the true value of nature.”40
Canada by Nancy Olewiler, (Toronto: The Nature Conservancy of Canada, 2004) [Nature
Conservancy of Canada].
38. For a discussion about the role of ecosystem services in the Canadian economy, see Canada,
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments of Canada, Canadian biodiversity: ecosystem
status and trends 2010, (Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2010) at 74 [Canadian
biodiversity]. See also Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Spotlight on Marine Protected
Areas in Canada, (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2010) (demonstrating the adoption
of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) definition of Marine
Protection Areas (MPAs), incorporating ecosystem services). In fact, a background paper
prepared for Environment Canada (EC) by Sustainable Prosperity identified nearly forty
federal and provincial programs already in place and working across Canada targeting a
particular type of ecosystem or service. See Sustainable Prosperity, Advancing the Economics
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Canada: A Survey of Economic Instruments for the
Conservation & Protection of Biodiversity by Alex Kenny et al (Ottawa: Environment
Canada, 2011) [Sustainable Prosperity].
39. For one of the earliest American examples, see James Salzman, “Review Essay: Valuing
Ecosystem Service” (1997) 24:4 Ecology LQ 887 at 902-03. Salzman notes that “it [is]
important for environmental lawyers to engage themselves in this research effort, both to
explore the role ecosystem services should play in the law’s development and to influence
the direction of research so that the services provided by nature may be accorded their
proper value.” For Canadian examples, see Heather McLeod-Kilmurray & Gavin Smith,
“Unsustainable Development in Canada: Environmental Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Environmental Justice in the Tar Sands” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 65 (arguing that
ecosystem services should be considered in environmental assessments, among other things);
Natalie Chalifour, “Encouraging the Transition to Sustainable Forestry in Canada with
Ecological Fiscal Reform - Potential and Pitfalls” (2004) 14 J Envtl L & Prac 253 (describing
maintenance of ecosystem services as an element of ecosystem-based forest management);
and Bruce Pardy, “Goods, Services, and Systems” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 445.
40. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human
Well-Being, Statement from the Board, (Washington, DC: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

OLSZYNSKI, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 137

I. A PRIMER ON ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND VALUATION
While the concept of ecosystem services can be very complex,41 the main idea is
straightforward: “[E]cosystems are socially valuable and in ways that may not be
immediately intuited.”42 Societies have long recognized that ecosystems are
socially valuable in some ways; most environmental laws, including those amended
by the EEA, are replete with references to the more obvious ways in which
humans benefit from ecosystems.43 For a variety of reasons, however, societies
have been largely ignorant of the fundamental role played by ecosystems in
sustaining not just human life but also human prosperity.44
A. ECOSYSTEMS PROCESSES, STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND SERVICES

As noted by the authors of The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services, “it is tempting
to overstate the case for ecosystem services, to try to find them everywhere simply
because anywhere is in one or another ecosystem.”45 The problem is exacerbated
because the same flurry of activity that has “provided much insight in how to
ensure that ecosystem service research is scientifically robust and credible”46 has
also generated several competing definitions and classification systems.47 All of
these, however, share the following two fundamental and interrelated perspectives
on ecosystem services. First, ecosystem services are distinct from ecosystem
attributes or properties, variously referred to as conditions, processes, functions,
and structure—these are the constituents of natural capital that make the flow of

41.
42.
43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

Board, 2005) at 5 online: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment <http://maweb.org/en/
BoardStatement.asp>.
Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 9. See also Norgaard, supra note 30.
James Boyd & Spencer Banzhaf, “What are ecosystem services? The need for standardized
environmental accounting units” (2007) 63:2-3 Ecological Econ 616 at 616.
Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 23. As one EEA-relevant example, Parliament passed
the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act [CNMCAA] because it wanted to
“provide opportunities for the people of Canada and of the world to appreciate and enjoy
Canada’s natural and cultural marine heritage… .” See SC 2002, c 18, preamble.
Most explanations centre on modern society’s detachment from the natural world. See
e.g. Daily, supra note 25; James Salzman, Barton H Thompson, Jr & Gretchen C Daily,
“Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl LJ
309 at 311.
Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 15.
Rudolf de Groot et al, “Integrating the Ecological and Economic Dimensions in Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Service Valuation” in Pushpam Kumar, ed, The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations (London: Earthscan, 2010) [TEEB] 9 at 16.
Boyd & Banzhaf, supra note 42 at 616.
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ecosystem goods and services possible. Second, like conventional perspectives on
environmentally derived benefits, ecosystem services “have relevance only to the
extent human populations benefit from them. They are purely anthropocentric.”48
In Nature’s Services, Professor Gretchen Daily described ecosystem services
as “the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems … sustain
and fulfill human life.”49 In his original study, Professor Robert Costanza referred
to ecosystem goods and services as “the benefits human populations derive …
from ecosystem functions,” listing seventeen major ecosystem services.50 In its
2005 report, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental Decision
Making, the United States National Research Council (NRC) also referred to
ecosystem functions but added ecosystem structure to the mix.51 That same year,
the United Nations released what many consider to be the leading effort in terms
of ecosystem services assessment and research, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
[MEA].52 The MEA adopted a broad definition of ecosystem services (the benefits
that humans derive from ecosystems),53 which it then divided into four more
detailed categories:
Provisioning services are the products people obtain from ecosystems, such as food,
fuel, fiber, fresh water, and genetic resources. Regulating services are the benefits
people obtain from the regulation of ecosystem processes, including air quality
maintenance … and water purification. Cultural services are the nonmaterial benefits
people obtain from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive development,
reflection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences. Supporting services are those that
are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services, such as primary
production, production of oxygen, and soil formation.54

Most of the literature subsequent to the MEA, including the Canadian
literature, appears to have adopted its classification system.55 While some have
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 15 [emphasis added].
Daily, supra note 25 at 3.
Costanza et al, supra note 26 at 253-54. For simplicity, Professor Robert Costanza refers to
ecosystem goods and services together as ecosystem services.
National Research Council, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental
Decision-Making, (Washington, DC: National Academic of Sciences, 2005) at viii online:
<http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11139> [NRC Report]. The NRC was
unequivocal in its support for this field, which it considered “a prerequisite for sensible
conservation decisions.”
See online: <http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx>.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and
Trends Assessment, vol 1 (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005) at v [MEA].
Ibid at 29.
See e.g. Shuang Liu et al, “Valuing ecosystem services: Theory, practice, and the need for
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expressed concerns that the MEA’s “overly generic definition of services … can
confound practical measurement”56 and have urged narrower definitions,57 there is
also recognition that “the conditions and processes underlying ecosystem service production are so tightly interlinked that any classification is inherently arbitrary,”58
and that “perhaps … no final classification can capture the myriad of ways in
which ecosystems support human life and contribute to human well-being.”59
Bearing in mind these latter two points, this article adopts the definition
and classification framework recently proposed by the United Nations Environmental Program in The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) project.60
Largely consistent with the analysis undertaken by the NRC, the MEA, and the
EPA-SAB,61 the TEEB framework makes important distinctions between ecosystem
structure, processes, functions, services, and benefits.
Like the MEA, TEEB defines an ecosystem as a dynamic complex of plant,
animal, and microorganism communities and the nonliving environment interacting as a functional unit.62 Ecosystem structure is the biophysical architecture
of an ecosystem,63 while ecosystem processes are the changes and reactions that
occur within ecosystems, whether physical, chemical, or biological, and include
decomposition, production, nutrient cycling, and fluxes of nutrients and energy.64
Ecosystem function, then, is defined as a subset of the interactions between
ecosystem structure and processes that underpin the capacity of an ecosystem to
provide goods and services.65 For example:

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.

a transdisciplinary synthesis” (2010) 1185 Ann NY Academy of Sci 54; Brauman et al,
supra note 29; EPA, supra note 33; Munns Jr et al, supra note 33. In Canada, see Canadian
biodiversity, supra note 38; Sustainable Prosperity, supra note 38.
Boyd & Banzhaf, supra note 42 at 623.
Ibid at 619. Boyd and Banzhaf also suggest that “ecosystem services are the components of
nature, directly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human well-being.”
Brauman et al, supra note 29 at 69.
de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 17.
TEEB, supra note 46.
de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 16.
TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiii (glossary definition for “Ecosystem”). See also Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005) at 27; EPA, supra note 33 at 12; and NRC Report,
supra note 51 at 59.
TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv (glossary definition for “Ecosystem structure”). See also NRC
Report, ibid at 60.
TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv (glossary definition for “Ecosystem process”).
Ibid at xxxiii (glossary definition for “Ecosystem function”). See also EPA, supra note 33 at
13; NRC Report, supra note 51 at 60.
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[P]rimary production (= process) is needed to maintain a viable fish population
(= function) which can be used (harvested) to provide food (= service); nutrient
cycling (= process) is needed for water purification (= function) to provide clean
water (= provisioning service).66

This distinction between functions (or processes) and services is critical.67 It
highlights both the potential and the limitations of ecosystem services as a framework for environmental valuation:
For example, the ability to absorb floodwater is a biophysical function. A service
is created if the absorbed floodwater yields less damage to buildings, roads, and
agriculture. Even if an ecosystem rates highly in terms of a functional characteristic,
that function may not provide a socially valuable service. While anthropocentric,
the notion of service value is the best practical means of differentiating between
ecosystems when making difficult tradeoffs. Biophysical characterizations are
fundamental to any ecosystem evaluation, but they are a poor guide to an ecosystem’s
social value.68

With respect to ecosystem services, TEEB essentially follows the MEA’s
typology (including the four categories), except that it makes a finer distinction
between services and benefits, clarifies that the term “ecosystem services” is
synonymous with ecosystem goods and services, and substitutes habitat services
for supporting services. Ecosystem services are thus conceived as “the direct and
indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-being,”69 and include the
following twenty-two main service types:70
PROVISIONING SERVICES
1. Food (e.g., fish, game, fruit)
2. Water (e.g., for drinking, irrigation, cooling)
3. Raw Materials (e.g., fiber, timber, fuel wood, fodder, fertilizer)
4. Genetic resources (e.g., for crop-improvement and medicinal purposes)
5. Medicinal resources (e.g., biochemical products, models & test-organisms)
6. Ornamental resources (e.g., artisan work, decorative plants, pet animals, fashion)
66. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 18.
67. See Heather Tallis & Stephen Polasky, “Mapping and Valuing Ecosystem Services as an
Approach for Conservation and Natural-Resource Management” (2009) 1162 Ann NY
Academy of Sci 265 at 271. Tallis & Polasky suggest: “Until there is some person somewhere
who is benefiting from a given process [function] it is only a process and not a service.”
68. James Boyd, Dennis King & Lisa A Wainger, “Compensation for Lost Ecosystem Services:
The Need for Benefit-Based Transfer Ratios and Restoration Criteria” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl
LJ 393 at 396.
69. TEEB, supra note 46 at xxxiv [emphasis added]. See also EPA, supra note 33 at 12, defining
ecosystem services as “the direct or indirect contributions that ecosystems make to the wellbeing of human populations.”
70. de Groot et al, supra note 46 at 25.
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REGULATING SERVICES
7. Air quality regulation (e.g., capturing (fine) dust, chemicals, etc.)
8. Climate regulation (incl. carbon-sequestration, influence of vegetation on rainfall, etc.)
9. Moderation of extreme events (e.g., storm protection and flood prevention)
10. Regulation of water flows (e.g., natural drainage, irrigation and drought prevention)
11. Waste treatment (especially water purification)
12. Erosion prevention
13. Maintenance of soil fertility (incl. soil formation)
14. Pollination
15. Biological control (e.g., seed dispersal, pest and disease control)
HABITAT SERVICES
16. Maintenance of life cycles of migratory species (incl. nursery service)
17. Maintenance of genetic diversity (especially in gene pool protection)
CULTURAL & AMENITY SERVICES
18. Aesthetic information
19. Opportunities for recreation & tourism
20. Inspiration for culture, art and design
21. Spiritual experience
22. Information for cognitive development

Of course, not all ecosystems provide all of these services, and provision varies
with scale and location. For example, wetlands (e.g., marshes, fens, peatlands)
provide numerous local, regional, and global services, including flood protection,
storm protection, water supply, improved water quality, waste assimilation,
commercial and recreational hunting and fishing, harvesting of natural materials,
energy resources, and climate stabilization.71
To put these services in more concrete terms, it is useful to consider the
results of Professor Nancy Olewiler’s 2004 study, The Value of Natural Capital in
Settled Areas of Canada:
•

Four-tenths of a hectare of wetlands can store over 6,000 cubic
meters of floodwater. … [regulating service, specifically moderation
of extreme events];

71. Luke M Brander, Raymond J G M Florax & Jan E Vermaat, “The Empirics of Wetland
Valuation: A Comprehensive Summary and a Meta-Analysis of the Literature” (2006)
33:2 Envtl & Resource Econ 223 at 226; Richard T Woodward & Yong-Suhk Wui, “The
economics value of wetland services: a meta-analysis” (2000) 37:2 Ecological Econ 257.
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•

•

•

Approximately 600 species of wildlife, including species at risk, use
wetlands in North America during … their life cycle. … [habitat
services];
[Wetlands produce] a wealth of products including fish and
shellfish, blueberries, cranberries, timber and wild rice, as well
as medicines that are derived from wetland soils and plants. …
[provisioning services];
[W]etland plants … can remove between 116 and 770 kg/ha/yr of
phosphorus and 350 to 32,000 kg/ha/yr of nitrogen. … While these
estimates have a wide range [due to differences in wetland location,
plant composition, and soil type], even the most conservative estimate
exceeds the amount of excess nitrogen and phosphorus that finds its
way into the [Fraser Valley’s] water supplies from current agricultural
practices.72 [regulating services, specifically waste treatment]

Finally, it should be clear from this brief survey that the goal has not been
merely to identify a subset of hitherto unrecognized contributions towards
human well-being, but rather to construct a framework through which all contributions, including long-recognized and familiar ones, could be conceptualized,
organized, and ultimately valued.73 It is for this reason that ecosystem services
assessment would be well-suited for environmental sentencing, as further
discussed below in Part II.
B. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES GIVE RISE TO USE AND NON-USE VALUES

In its most basic terms, environmental valuation is economic valuation—“the
valuation in monetary terms of items that people might care for”74—applied to
the natural world. The goal is to determine the utility, or satisfaction, that
individuals derive from the environment. It is not to discern the objective value
of ecosystems with a view towards sustainability or intergenerational equity,75
72. Nature Conservancy of Canada, supra note 37 at 6, 15. See also online: Ducks Unlimited
Canada <http://www.ducks.ca/conserve/wetland_values/index.html>.
73. Professors Ruhl, Kraft & Lant seem to take a different approach, defining ecosystem services
as a discrete set of benefits alongside more conventional ones. See supra note 24 at 23.
74. Hanemann, supra note 21 at 66.
75. Robert Costanza & Carl Folke, “Valuing Ecosystem Services with Efficiency, Fairness, and
Sustainability as Goals” in Daily, supra note 25 at 49. The authors write:
Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item to meeting a specific goal. … In
ecology, a gene is valuable to the extent it contributes to the goal of survival of the individuals
possessing it and their progeny. In conventional economics, a commodity is valuable to the
extent it contributes to the goal of individual welfare as assessed by willingness to pay. The
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although the existence of such concerns by individuals can and does affect this
exercise. In other words, environmental valuation is positivistic rather than
normative, asking what value people place on the environment in light of
competing preferences as opposed to how much value they perhaps should place.
Economists divide environmental values into two basic categories: use value
and non-use value (the latter was referred to as “passive” value in Canfor).76 Use
values arise where utility is derived from actual use of the environment. They can
be consumptive, as where fish are used for food, or non-consumptive, as in the
case of bird watching.77 Use values can also be direct or indirect. In the preceding
examples, the fish and birds are directly valued. Their survival, however, depends on
their habitat, the appreciation of which gives rise to indirect use value.78 Economists
have also long recognized that “[m]any people donate to conservation charities
concerned with protecting wildlife they will never directly experience, such as
tigers or whales, or with protecting natural areas they may never travel to.”79
These are non-use values80 and include the existence, option, and bequest values
identified in Canfor.81
What then, is the relationship between use and non-use values and ecosystem
services?
The array of services provided by ecosystems spans all of … [the] categories of values.
The pest-control and flood-control services they offer have direct use value to nearby
agricultural producers. Their provision of habitats for migratory birds implies an
point is that one cannot state a value without stating the goal being served. Conventional
economic value is based on the goal of individual utility maximization. But other goals, and
thus other values, are possible. For example, if the goal is sustainability, one should assess value
based on the contribution to achieving that goal.

76. Nick Hanley, “The Economic Value of Environmental Damage” in Michael Bowman & Alan
Boyle, eds, Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002) 27 at 27; Canfor, supra note 9 at para 11.
77. See Frank B Cross, “Natural Resource Damage Valuation” (1989) 42:2 Vand L Rev 269.
Cross notes:
A 1975 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) study found that some twenty
million Americans participated in “sport hunting,” spending nearly six billion dollars in the
process. When the same family goes bird watching, they still use and value the resources, but in
a non-consumptive way. The magnitude of non-consumptive use of natural resources considerably exceeds even consumptive uses (at 281).

78. Lawrence H Goulder & Donald Kennedy, “Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical Bases
and Empirical Methods” in Daily, supra note 25 at 23.
79. Hanley, supra note 76 at 27.
80. See Jason J Czarnezki & Adrianne K Zahner, “The Utility of Non-Use Values In Natural
Resource Damage Assessments” (2005) 32 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 509 at 511-512.
81. Supra note 9 at paras 138-40.
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indirect use value to people who enjoy watching or hunting these animals … .
Ecosystems also yield an existence value: wetlands, for example, provide such value
to people who simply appreciate the fact that wetlands exist.82

In the specific language of the TEEB/MEA framework, direct use values
are generally derived from provisioning and cultural services and are typically
enjoyed by people located in the ecosystem itself.83 Fishing and bird watching
are two examples. Indirect use values are “derived from ecosystem services that
provide benefits outside the ecosystem itself. Examples include the natural water
filtration function of wetlands, which often benefits people far downstream …
This category of benefits corresponds to the MA notion of regulating services.”84
Option values are derived from preserving for future use services that may not
be used presently. The value derived from preservation for one’s own future use is
called option value; that derived from preservation for one’s heirs is called bequest
value.85 Finally, non-use values largely fall within the cultural services category.
The sum of all of these values represents the Total Economic Value (TEV) of a
given ecosystem asset.86
Because it is not possible to measure utility itself, economists rely on individuals’
willingness to pay (WTP) or, in certain limited circumstances, willingness to
accept compensation (WTA) as a measure of utility.87 Where utility is derived
from private goods available in a market, such as a car, economists are often satisfied
to rely on the market price of such goods as a measure of WTP (and thus utility).
In the case of most ecosystem goods and services, however, their status as public
goods for which no private markets exist requires the application of non-market
valuation techniques.
Returning again to the wetlands of the Fraser Valley, Professor Olewiler found
a number of studies applying such techniques (some of which are discussed
further below) that estimated the value of all the goods and services provided

82. Goulder & Kennedy in Daily, supra note 25 at 25. The relationships are also well captured in
figures found in the NRC Report, supra note 51 at 241; and de Groot et al, supra note 46 at
17.
83. Supra note 53 at 54.
84. Ibid at 54.
85. Ibid.
86. Originally coined by David Pearce. See Economic values and the natural world (London:
Earthscan, 1993). See also Unai Pascaul et al, “The Economics of Valuing Ecosystem Services
and Biodiversity” in TEEB, supra note 46, 183 at 188.
87. “[I]f individuals are deemed to have the right to enjoy the pre-loss level of environmental
quality, then … [WTA] should be measured; alternatively, if they have no such right, then
WTP measures should be sought.” Hanley, supra note 76 at 28.
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by one hectare of wetlands between $5,792 and $24,330 per year. Using the
lower estimate, the approximately forty thousand hectares of Lower Fraser
Valley wetlands have an annual value of $231.7 million.88 More recently, a report
commissioned by the Boreal Forest Initiative estimates the value of seventeen
ecosystem services from Canada’s northern Mackenzie Region alone at $570.6
billion per year.89
C. TOOLS FOR ASSESSMENT AND VALUATION: THE NRDA EXPERIENCE

Ecosystem services assessment and valuation can be carried out for various purposes,
including land-use decision making90 and natural-resource management.91
The context most relevant to EDA, natural resources damages assessment
(NRDA) under CERCLA and OPA, also happens to be the most established and
sophisticated.92
CERCLA was US Congress’s response to the improper disposal of hazardous
substances for over half a century and to the enormous environmental degradation
associated therewith.93 Primarily a civil liability scheme designed to apportion the
88. Nature Conservancy of Canada, supra note 37 at 15.
89. Canadian Boreal Initiative, The Real Wealth of the Mackenzie Region by Mark Alnielski &
Sara Wilson (Ottawa: Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2009) at 1, online:
<http://www.borealcanada.ca>.
90. In a 2006 article, author and journalist Chris Wood described efforts by Ontario’s Grand
River Conservation Authority to keep that basin’s “water factories” clean that are akin, in
purpose if not in scale, to what has been described as the “poster child” for recognizing
ecosystem services—the City of New York’s decision to restore the degraded Catskill
watershed to ensure the provision of clean drinking water at a fraction of the cost of building
a new and otherwise necessary water filtration plan. See Chris Wood, “The Business of Saving
the Earth”, The Walrus (October 2008), online: The Walrus <http://walrusmagazine.com/
articles/2008.10-environment-chris-wood-water-economy/>.
91. In 2008, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) jointly published final regulations introducing ecosystem services into the decisionmaking standards for authorizing compensatory mitigation of impacts to aquatic resources
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 USC §1251 (1972) [CWA]. See JB Ruhl, James
Salzman & Iris Goodman, “Implementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate: A Catalyst
for Advancing Science and Policy” (2009) 31:2 Nat’l Wetlands Newsletter 11. The United
Stated Forestry Service has also recognized the need to consider ecosystem services in carrying
out its mandate. See online: <http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices>.
92. Shuang Liu et al, supra note 55 at 64. See also James Boyd, Dennis King & Lisa A Wainger,
“Compensation for Lost Ecosystem Services: The Need for Benefit-Based Transfer Ratios and
Restoration Criteria” (2001) 20:2 Stan Envtl LJ 393 at 402.
93. Jeffrey G Miller & Craig N Johnston, The Law of Hazardous Waste Disposal and Remediation,
2d ed (New York: West, 2005) at 52. See also Cross, supra note 22; and Binger, Copple &
Hoffman, supra note 22.
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costs of cleaning up contaminated sites among “potentially responsible parties”
(PRPs), subsection 9607(a)(4)(C) also authorizes “trustees” to recover damages
“for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss” resulting from a release of hazardous substances.94 The OPA was Congress’s response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill and contains essentially the same NRDA provisions.95
Recognizing that the measurement of such damages would be difficult,
Congress delegated the task of promulgating regulations to the President. In the
case of CERCLA, they specified that two types of procedures should be developed:
relatively simple Type A assessment procedures, which would be applicable to
minor releases; and more complex Type B assessment procedures, to be used
when the damage to natural resources was more significant and required extensive
field work.96 No such distinction is made in the OPA,97 the regulations under
which are the responsibility of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). While the procedures in these regulations are not mandatory,
their use triggers a rebuttable presumption of accuracy with respect to the assessment
of damages in the context of litigation.98
CERCLA Type A procedures use computer programs to model the fate of
released substances, predict injuries, and calculate damages.99 Certain states,
including California, Washington, and Florida, have followed suit and designed
their own simplified procedures,100 which employ schedules or formulae to determine
damages.101 These usually require a limited set of data, such as the type of habitat
in which a spill or release has occurred, the amount of the spill, and the duration
of the event.

94. 42 USC §9607. See Cross, supra note 22 at 321. Cross notes that “the definition of natural
resources includes “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources” (at 321). Damages recovered by the government are to be
“available for use to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources”
by the appropriate agencies of the federal government or the state government.
95. See 33 USCA § 2702 for the definition of damages and § 2701 for the definition of natural
resources.
96. 42 USCA § 9651(c)(2)
97. 33 USCA § 2706(e)(1)
98. For CERCLA, see § 107 (f )(2)(C). For OPA, see 33 USC § 2707 (1990).
99. Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances 73 CFR Part 11 (2008) [NRDHS].
100. Ibid.
101. Amy W Ando & Madhu Khanna, “Natural Resource Damage Assessment Methods: Lessons
in Simplicity from State Trustees” (2004) 22:4 Contemporary Econ Pol’y 504.
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CERCLA Type B and OPA procedures rely on the concept of services as their
metric for damages.102 Somewhat surprisingly—given that neither CERCLA nor
the OPA contain any reference to this term and that the initial publication of
both sets of regulations predated the flurry of activity with respect to ecosystem
services described in the previous Part103—the definition of services in both the
CERCLA and the OPA regulations is entirely consistent with the ecosystem services
concept described here.104 The NOAA’s Damage Assessment, Remediation, and
Restoration Program (DARRP) website specifically references the MEA and
explains that “[t]his injury assessment process is based on the understanding that
functioning ecosystems provide multiple ecosystem services that are critical to dayto-day activities on this planet.”105
That being said, because the focus under both statutory schemes is increasingly
on restoring damaged natural resources, including for interim loss,106 ecosystem
102. Thus, the goal of the OPA regulations is to “make the environment and public whole for
injuries to natural resources and services,” which is achieved by retuning these to baseline
conditions and compensating for interim losses from the date of the incident until recovery:
see 15 CFR § 990.10 (2012). The CERCLA regulations take a more circuitous route. The
purpose of the damage determination phase under the CERCLA regulations is “to establish
the amount of money to be sought in compensation for injuries to natural resources,”
where the measure of damages is the cost of either restoration of the injured resources or
the replacement of equivalent natural resources, both of which are measured in terms of the
level of services provided by the injured resource at baseline, and may include “compensable
value”: see 43 CFR § 11.80 (2007). Compensable value includes “the economic value of lost
services provided by the injured resources, including both public use and non-use values such
as existence and bequest values.” Both use and non-use values are further defined as deriving
from services: see 43 CFR § 11.83 (2007).
103. See Katharine K Baker, “Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural
Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss” (1995) 22 Ecology LQ 677 at 705 (and
footnote 143 in particular).
104. Under the OPA regulations, “[s]ervices (or natural resource services) means the functions
performed by a natural resource for the benefit of another natural resource and/or the
public”: see 15 CFR § 990.30 (2012). Under the CERCLA regulations, “services” means the
physical and biological functions performed by the resource including the human uses of
those functions. These services are the result of the physical, chemical, or biological quality of
the resource”: see 43 CFR § 11.14 (2007).
105. Online: Damage Assessment, Restoration, & Restoration Program <http://darrp.noaa.
gov/economics/index.html> [DAARP] [emphasis in original]. The DAARP also “provides
permanent expertise within NOAA to assess and restore natural resources injured by
releases of oil and hazardous substances, as well as by physical impacts, such as vessel
groundings in National Marine Sanctuaries.” See online: DAARP <http://www.darrp.noaa.
gov/about/index.html>.
106. See NRDHS, supra note 99.
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services are decreasingly likely to be valued directly. Instead, they are likely to be
valued indirectly in terms of the cost of carrying out restoration projects:
[S]ervice-to-service scaling is the preferred approach for determining the required
amount of compensatory restoration following an injury. In this approach,
the services lost from natural resource injury are equated to the services gained from
restoration. Using the critical assumption that the services lost from the injury are of
the same type and value as those restored through a compensatory project, no direct
valuation of the injured resources or restored resources occurs.107

According to the regulatory impact analysis that accompanied the 2008
revisions to the CERCLA regulations, scaling techniques such as Habitat
Equivalency Analysis (HEA) “are frequently simpler and more transparent
than methodologies used to measure the economic value of losses.”108 In Canada,
restoration costs have also been advanced as the presumptive measure of environmental damages.109
Direct environmental valuation becomes necessary where restoration
is impractical, inadequate, or otherwise deemed inappropriate. Much has been
written about the various tools that can be employed for this purpose, which economists group into two categories: revealed and stated preference techniques.110
The former includes market price (primarily as a measure of consumptive use
value, e.g., for provisioning services such as fish), travel cost (primarily as a measure
The NRDAR advisory committee recommended that DOI should amend its current regulation
to explicitly authorize trustees to use the cost of restoration actions that address service losses to
calculate all damages, including interim losses. Providing the option for a ‘restoration-based’
approach to all damages better comports with CERCLA’s overall restoration objectives.

107.
108.

109.
110.

See “Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances,” 73 Federal Register 192 (2
October 2008) at 57260.
DAARP, supra note 105.
NRDHS, supra note 99 at 11083. In Canada, Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) has been
considered for the purpose of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ (DFO) fish habitat
compensation program pursuant to its Fisheries Act authorization policy (commonly referred
to as its “No Net Loss policy”). See RSC 1985, c F-14, s 35(2) [Fisheries Act]. See also
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Review of Approaches for Estimating Changes in Productive
Capacity from Whole-lake / Stream Destruction and Related Compensation Projects by G A
Packman et al (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2006) at 43.
OLRC Report, supra note 8 at 56.
Most of these methodologies, and their strengths and weaknesses, are discussed by
Professors Elgie and Lintner in their case comment on Canfor. See supra note 15. See also
OLRC Report, supra note 8; and Edgar Gold, David L VanderZwaag & Meinhard Doelle,
“Economic Loss and Environmental Damages: Developments in Claims for Offshore Oil
Pollution” (1991) 1 J Envtl L & Prac 129; and supra notes 22 and supra note 94 (American
literature within).
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of use value, but including both consumptive and non-consumptive uses, e.g.,
recreational services such as fishing and bird watching, respectively) and hedonic
pricing (using property value to estimate environmental values, especially non-use
values). Probably the most controversial example of a stated preference technique
is contingent valuation (CV), which essentially involves conducting surveys designed
to elicit individuals’ preferences for the environment or specific goods and services.
All these techniques were discussed to some extent in Canfor.111
Another method for valuation is benefit transfer. Benefit transfer uses
information derived from existing valuation studies to assign values in another
context. Since 1992, Environment Canada (EC) has been working with various
international experts and organizations, including the US Environmental Protection
Agency, to develop and implement a benefit transfer “infobase” called the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI).112
This is not to suggest that ecosystem services assessment and valuation is an
exact science. “Even when valuation is informed by the best available science,
the valuation process will almost always involve uncertainty. Uncertainty arises
in the prediction of changes in ecosystems, in the resulting change in the flow
of services, and in estimating the values associated with those changes.”113 That
being said, most environmental regulation operates on the frontier of science,
where “scientific uncertainty is endemic.”114 Moreover, in the specific context of
ecosystem services valuation, many observers agree that uncertainties result in
underestimation rather than overestimation of value.115

II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA UNDER THE EEA
A. CURRENT APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING IN CANADA

In Canfor, the Court drew a distinction between physical damages and compensable
loss, highlighting an important distinction between civil and criminal liability:

111. Supra note 9 at paras 141-43.
112. Online: Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory <https://www.evri.ca/Other/
AboutEVRI.aspx>. For example, a keynote search for “wetlands” by the author generated 199
results, including Professor Olewiler’s study, supra note 37.
113. EPA, supra note 33 at 16.
114. See generally Daniel A Farber, “Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and
the Environmental Prospect” (2003) 87:4 Minn L Rev 852 at 855.
115. See e.g. Costanza et al, supra note 26 at 258. See also EPA, supra note 33 at 16 (discussing the
problems that the public’s general lack of understanding about ecosystem services can pose
for valuation).
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This appeal is thus not about proof of physical damages, but about the proof and
assessment of compensable loss … . [I]n assessing compensatory damages for environmental loss, the Court ought not to be engaged merely in punishment of the
wrongdoer (which is the domain of regulatory offences) or imputing losses based
on little more than a generalized desire to mete out rough justice to a tortfeasor.”116

In other words, civil liability and liability for regulatory (variously referred
to as “statutory” or “public welfare”)117 offences serve different purposes. In the
former context, the driving principle is restitutio in integrum: “restoration to the
previous condition or the status quo,”118 fairness being “best achieved by avoiding
both undercompensation and overcompensation.”119 In the regulatory context,
on the other hand, the general purpose is to impose sanctions that foster “respect
for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.”120 In the
specific context of environmental offences, moreover, most observers agree that
deterrence and respect for the regulatory process are the primary objectives:
Suffice it to say that Canadian courts have settled upon the need for pollution prevention
via deterrence, and the need to generate societal respect for the regulatory process, as
the most relevant objectives of environmental sentencing.
The rationale is that since prosecutions occur after an offence, and the environmental
damage is already done, any hope for the future protection of the public welfare
needs to come from any deterrent effect of the sentence.121

Although a detailed review of the case law on this point is beyond the scope
of this article, one of the benchmark decisions on the importance of deterrence is
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Cotton Felts Ltd:122
In our complex interdependent modern society … regulatory statutes are accepted
as essential in the public interest. … To a very large extent the enforcement of such
statutes is achieved by fines imposed on offending corporations. The amount of
116. Supra note 9 at para 59 [emphasis in original].
117. See R v Sault Ste Marie (City), [1978] SCR 1299, 85 DLR (3d) 161. See also Mark Davidson,
“Innocent Drops and the Symbolic Generalization of Moral Harms: A New Basis for the
Criminalization of Environmental Offences” (2005) 16:1 J Envtl L & Prac 19 at 22-23.
118. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed, sub verbo “restitutio in integrum.”
119. Raytch v Bloomer, [1990] 1 SCR 940 at para 47, 69 DLR (4th) 25.
120. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.
121. Elaine L Hughes & Dr Larry A Reynolds, “Creative Sentencing and Environmental
Protection” (2009) 19:2 J Envtl L & Prac 105 at 108. See also Davidson, supra note 117
at 37 (discussing deterrence); and Sherie Verhulst, “Legislating a Principled Approach to
Sentencing in Relation to Regulatory Offences” (2009) 12:3 Can Crim L Rev 281 at 291.
122. (1982), 8 WCB 447, 2 CCC (3d) 287 [Cotton Felts]. This case was recently cited with
approval in R v Alpha Manufacturing Inc et al, [2005] BCSC 1644 at para 48, 68 WCB (2d)
77, and R v Terroco Industries Ltd, 2005 ABCA 141 at para 60, 41 Alta LR (4th) 1 [Terroco].
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the fine will be determined by a complex set of considerations … . Above all, the
amount of the fine will be determined by the need to enforce regulatory standards
by deterrence.123

In order to meet these objectives, Canadian courts have long recognized the
need for a “special approach” to environmental sentencing.124 Probably the most
often cited cases with respect to what this entails are R v United Keno Hill Mines
(1980)125 and R v Bata Industries Ltd (1993).126 In the latter case, and relying very
much on the former, the court set out the following list of factors to be considered
in sentencing, which continue to guide courts to this day:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The Nature of the Environment Affected;
Extent of the Injury;
Deliberateness of the Offence
The Attitude of the Accused.127

In sentencing corporations, the Court should also consider the following:
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

The size, wealth, nature of operations and power of the corporation;
The extent or attempts to comply;
Remorse;
Profits realized by the offence; and
Criminal record or other evidence of good character.128

Of relevance here is that Canadian courts have long considered it necessary
to take into account the nature of the environment affected and the extent of
actual or potential damage caused by an offence. Perhaps the most explicit plea
for such evidence was made in United Keno Hill itself:
In environmental cases, the courts do and should vary the severity of punishment
in accord with the nature of the environment affected and the extent of damage
inflicted.

123. Cotton Felts, supra note 122 at para 19.
124. See R v Kenaston Drill (Arctic) LTD (1973), 12 CCC (2d) 383, [1973] NWTJ No 1 (SC).
This case was cited with approval in United Keno Hill, supra note 7.
125. For a more recent example, see R v Schuizke, 2008 SKPC 149 at paras 32, 55, 88, 328 Sask
R 112. As of 2005, United Keno Hill had been followed 19 times and mentioned 31 times.
See Davidson, supra note 117 at 36, n 68.
126. [1995] OR (3d) 321 127 DLR (4th) 438 (Ont CA),, rev’g in part [1993] 14 OR (3d) 354,
11 CELR (NS) 208 (Ont Gen Div), rev’g on other grounds [1992] OR (3d) 329, 7 CELR
(NS) 245 (ONCJ PD) [Bata].
127. [1993], ibid at para 20 [emphasis added].
128. See Stanley David Berger, The Prosecution and Defence of Environmental Offences (Aurora:
Canada Law Book, 2008) at 7:13.
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(a) Nature of Environment
A unique ecological area supporting rare flora and fauna, a high-use recreational
watershed, or an essential wildlife habitat, are environments calling upon users to
exercise special care. Any injury to such areas must be more severely condemned
than environmental damage to less sensitive areas.
(b) Extent of Injury
Penalties should reflect the degree of damage inflicted ... In some instances not only
the actual damage caused but [also] the potential damage that might have emanated
from the polluter’s activities must be considered. …
As in assault offences the more severe the beating the greater the condemnation expressed in sentencing. Similarly, evidence of injury should be tendered in environmental cases. …
Most sentencing dispositions in environmental cases necessitate expert and technical
evidence to describe the extent of environmental harm caused by the offence.129

Canadian courts have long been willing (if not eager) to consider detailed,
technical expert evidence with respect to actual and potential environmental
harm. That being said, they have also recognized that ascertaining and quantifying
harm is difficult in most environmental cases.130 Even where evidence of harm
has been introduced, there does not appear to be any consistent approach for
translating such harm into a monetary figure other than perhaps the principle of
parity, which requires “similar sentences to similar offenders for similar offences
committed in similar circumstances.”131
Two exceptions are R v Carriere132 and R v George M Caseley & Sons Inc.133
The former is demonstrative of Canadian judges’ willingness to seriously engage
the issue of environmental harm generally and an economic approach to sentencing
specifically; the latter illustrates some of the challenges that prosecutors will face
when introducing such evidence. While Canadian courts have recognized that
environmental harm has an economic component in other cases,134 these two
129. Supra note 7 at paras 11-14, 16.
130. For a recent case, see R v Northwest Territories Power Corp, 2011 NWTTC 3 at para 89, 2011
CELR (3d) 257 [Northwest Territories].
131. Ibid at para 107 (citing section 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code). See also Terroco, supra note
122 at para 65.
132. 2005 SKPC 84, 272 Sask R 13 [Carriere].
133. (2004) CELR (3d) 178, 716 APR 194 (PEPC) [Caseley].
134. See e.g. R v Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Ltd (2010), 53 CELR (3d) 108 at paras 23, 25,
317 Nfld & PEIR 309 (NFPC); Fletcher v Kingston (City), [1999] OJ 5705 (QL) at para 3
(ONCJ PD); R v New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, 10 CELR (NS) 184 at para 49,
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decisions stand out for the extent to which the courts explored economic principles
and tools in the context of quantifying environmental harm.
In R v Carriere, the accused were convicted of an offence under the Migratory
Birds Convention Act [MBCA] (one of the statutes amended by the EEA), namely,
the illegal taking of birds. Justice Robinson observed that:
Paragraph 13(4.1)(a) of the [pre-EEA] Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994 says
that a court imposing a sentence shall take into account “the harm or risk of harm
caused by the commission of the offence.” The question thus arising is, “What is the
harm or risk of harm caused by the accused’s actions?” …
By accepting that harm would result from a reduction in wild duck populations, I
am necessarily assuming that wild ducks have a value. But what value? … [A] proper
assessment of the harm or risk of harm … cannot occur without at least some
understanding of what wild ducks are worth.
[T]he Convention recognizes that “many of these species [migratory birds] are of
great value as a source of food or in destroying insects which are injurious to forests
and forage plants on the public domain, as well as to agricultural crops, in both
Canada and the Unites States … .”
Some of the values might be impossible to quantify in dollars, but they are important
nonetheless. Few would suggest there is no aesthetic value in seeing large flocks of
ducks flying overhead during the fall migration.
Ducks also have a real dollar value when used for some purposes, most notably, sport
hunting. As set out in figures below, sport hunters kill as many as 14 million ducks
each year in North America … . It would have been very useful to know what an
individual duck is worth in dollars to the sport hunting industry. Is it $10 or $100
or something quite different? As it is, I am left to assume that ducks have a significant
value to the industry without having any precise figure for what that value might be.135

Thus, while Justice Robinson was technically (albeit understandably, bearing
in mind the lack of submissions on this point) wrong in concluding that
aesthetic values are impossible to quantify in monetary terms, he was prescient
in recognizing that ducks confer numerous benefits to society, including provisioning
services (e.g., food), regulating services (e.g., biological control), and cultural and
amenity services (e.g., hunting and bird watching), and in his willingness to consider
their economic value for the purposes of sentencing.
In R v Caseley, on the other hand, Justice Thomson seemed less willing to
consider economic value. That case involved the deposit of pesticides into the
Wilmot River from an adjacent field following a large rain event, contrary to
[1991] NBJ 1144 (NBCP); United Keno Hill, supra note 7 at para 9.
135. Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 21, 23-24, 26-27.
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subsection 36(3) of the Fisheries Act. 136 The Crown sought to quantify the
environmental harm not only as the costs of restocking and monitoring the
Wilmot River (for a total of $12,800),137 but also to include what the court
deemed “more intangible losses which economists apparently believe occur from
these kinds of events”:
Ms. DeBaie assigned a dollar value to the time spent by volunteers although they
were unpaid. She assigned a dollar value to the work of government employees
although no additional staff were hired as a result of this offence. She assigned a dollar
value to the recreational enjoyment of individual fishers and multiplied it by the
projected numbers of fishers who might be expected to use the Wilmot River, and
multiplied that by the number of days that those individuals might have fished. …
Ms. DeBaie then attempted to quantify the total overall economic impact of resident,
visiting non-resident Canadian, and visiting non-Canadian fishers not fishing on
Prince Edward Island and in the case of non-residents, apparently not even visiting
Prince Edward Island because of the closure of the Wilmot River to recreational
fishing. Ms. DeBaie estimates that the total impact could be as high as $690,000 per
year while the river remains closed.
The difficulty which the Court has with Ms. DeBaie’s evidence is that it is for the
most part not based on empirically grounded data. There is no evidence of how
many people fished the Wilmot River, on average, before its closure. There is no
evidence that even one fisher stopped fishing in east Prince County because of the
closure. There is no evidence that even one visitor failed to come to Prince Edward
Island and fish because of the closure.
[W]ithout evidence based on hard data, in the Court’s view, Ms. DeBaie’s conclusion
must be regarded as speculation and insufficient grounds upon which to base any
form of restitution order.138

Although perhaps not as dismissive as the defendant’s expert in Canfor, who
characterized environmental loss valuations as “airy-fairy,”139 Justice Thomson was
clearly skeptical of the Crown’s evidence and its approach to environmental harm
generally. While some of his concerns were valid, his disbelief was misplaced. The
work of volunteers, for example, reflects the existence of non-use values derived
from the Wilmot River’s cultural services. With respect to the work of government employees, American courts have determined that recoverable costs under
CERLCA include both case-specific government expenses and indirect costs,
136.
137.
138.
139.

Supra note 108.
Caseley, supra note 133 at para 9.
Ibid at paras 10-13 [emphasis added].
Supra note 9 at para 59.
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recognizing that in a world of budgets and limited resources, expending and even
redirecting funds is also reflective of the value of the ecosystem.140
Finally, numerous Canadian environmental laws authorize compensation to
persons or to relevant government departments for what are essentially ecosystem
service losses caused by conduct that contravenes those laws or any regulations
made thereunder.141 Section 42 of the Fisheries Act, for example, not only makes
polluters civilly liable to the Crown for remediation costs, it also allows commercial
fishers to recover lost income “to the extent that the loss can be established to
have been incurred as a result of the deposit” of deleterious substances.142 This is,
in effect, an action for the loss of provisioning services (i.e., of fish for food)—
a loss that figured prominently in the damage assessment following the Exxon
Valdez spill and that will likely figure prominently in damages claims against BP
following the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico.143
Justice Thomson’s decision is nevertheless useful for several reasons. It
suggests that restoration costs may not always adequately reflect ecosystem
service losses, especially cultural services. It also identifies some of the challenges
that prosecutors are bound to face when introducing such evidence. For example,
the Crown should have introduced evidence (as would be required in an action
under subsection 42(3)) about the actual extent of fishing before and after the
offence in order to establish the loss (including potential loss) in this instance.144
The decision also serves as a reminder that the Crown must prove the existence of
an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.145

140. United States Environmental Protection Agency v Bell Petroleum Services Inc, 734 F Supp 771,
rev’d on other grounds, 3 F 3(d) 889 (5th Circuit 1993).
141. See e.g. CEPA, 1999, supra note 3, s 40.
142. Fisheries Act, supra note 108, s 42(3). See Gold, VanderZwaag & Doelle, supra note 111 at 149.
143. Keith H Hirokawa, “Disasters And Ecosystem Services Deprivation: From Cuyahoga to The
Deepwater Horizon, (2011) 74:1 Alb L Rev at 555. Hirokawa observes:
The Gulf ’s provisioning services affect the entire nation’s seafood markets and the region’s economy. In 2008, commercial fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico supported a commercial fishing
harvest of 1.27 billion pounds of finfish and shellfish at a value of $659 million in landings
revenue [emphasis in original].

144. As an example, an assessment of the recreational fishery value provided by the Credit River,
near Toronto, Ontario, indicated recreational benefits of $1.2 million dollars per year to
anglers who fish the Credit. See Pembina Institute & Credit Valley Conservation, Natural
Credit: Estimating the Value of Natural Capital in the Credit River Watershed by Mike
Kennedy & Jeff Wilson (Drayton Valley: Pembina Institute, 2009) at 31, online: Pembina
Institute <www.pembina.org> [Pembina Institute].
145. See Criminal Code, supra note 120 at s 724(3)(e); R v Gardiner, [1982] 2 SCR 368 at 26,
140 DLR (3d) 612.

156

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACT

The EEA amends nine federal environmental statutes: the Antarctic Environmental Protection Act;146 the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act
[CNMCAA]147 the Canada National Parks Act;148 the Canada Wildlife Act;149 the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA, 1999);150 the International River
Improvements Act;151 the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994;152 the Saguenay –
St. Lawrence Marine Park Act;153 and the Wild Animal and Plant Protection and
Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act.154 All of these statutes
contain provisions that prohibit harm either to a particular environment—such
as a marine conservation area, national park, or international river—or caused by
a particular activity, such as the handling and disposal of hazardous substances or
the killing of or trading in wildlife. They also contain other kinds of prohibitions,
including those related to the filing of documents and records, which may not be
directly related to any kind of environmental harm.155
When all of the EEA’s provisions are proclaimed into force, each of the nine
statutes will have essentially the same “purpose of sentencing” clause, tailored
to the specific circumstances of each act. Thus, under the CNPA, the amending
provisions of which have already been proclaimed into force,
[t]he fundamental purpose of sentencing for offences under this Act is to contribute
to respect for the law establishing and protecting parks through the imposition of just
sanctions that have as their objectives
(a)

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

to deter the offender and any other person from committing offences under
this Act;

SC 2003, c 20 [AEPA].
CNMCAA, supra note 43.
SC 2000, c 32 [CNPA].
RSC 1985, c W-9 [CWA].
Supra note 3.
RSC 1985, c I-20 [IRIA].
Supra note 5.
SC 1997, c 37 [SSLMPA].
SC 1992, c 52 [WAPPRIITA]. The EEA also creates the Environmental Violations
Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, SC 2009, c 14, s 126 [EVAMPA]. This act establishes
an administrative monetary penalty scheme applicable to the acts listed above, as well as to
the Canada Water Act, RSC 1985, c C-11 [CWA].
155. See e.g. MBCA, supra note 5, s 5.2. The Act states: “No person shall (a) wilfully destroy or
cause to be destroyed a document, a record or data that is required to be kept under this Act
or the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, or wilfully alter or cause to be altered such a document, a
record or data with intent to mislead.”

OLSZYNSKI, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 157

(b) to denounce unlawful conduct that damages or creates a risk of damage to
parks; and
(c) to restore park resources.156

In addition to deterrence and respect for the regulatory process, both of
which are already established objectives in sentencing, Canadian judges must
now have regard to restoration. Although judges have been ordering restoration
and remediation under the guise of “creative sentencing” for several years, these
have not generally been regarded as objectives in sentencing.157
Through this addition, Parliament can be considered as having confirmed
a “polluter pays” approach to sentencing. Already “firmly entrenched in
environmental law in Canada,”158 the polluter pays principle “assigns polluters
the responsibility for remedying contamination for which they are responsible
and imposes on them the direct and immediate costs of pollution.”159 While the
actual phrase need not be used in order for the principle to find application,160
it is not surprising that three of the statutes amended by the EEA explicitly refer
to the polluter pays principle in the context of this new third objective. Under
CEPA, 1999, for example, the objective is “to reinforce the ‘polluter pays’
principle by ensuring that offenders are held responsible for effective clean-up
and environmental restoration.”161
To meet these purposes, Parliament has introduced new “principles of sentencing”
into each of the nine statutes. Pursuant to subsection 13.1(1)(a) of the MBCA, for
example, a court is directed to consider—in addition to the principles and factors
set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code—the principle that the amount of the
fine should be increased to account for and reflect the gravity of the aggravating
factors associated with the offence, including those set out in subsection 13.1(2):
(a) the offence caused damage or risk of damage to migratory birds or their nests;
(b) the offence caused damage or risk of damage to any unique, rare, particularly
important or vulnerable population of migratory birds;
(c) the damage caused by the offence is extensive, persistent or irreparable162
CNPA, supra note 148, s 27.6 [emphasis added].
Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 111-12.
Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at para 23, 2 SCR 624.
Ibid at para 24.
Jerry V DeMarco, “Building a Strong Foundation for Action: A Review of Twelve
Fundamental Principles of Environmental and Resource Management Legislation” (2008)
19:1 J Envtl L & Prac 59 at 64.
161. CEPA, 1991, supra note 3, s 287(c). Similar wording is found in the AEPA: see supra note
146, s 50.9. Under the MBCA, the objective is “to reinforce the ‘polluter pays’ principle and
to restore migratory birds and their habitats.” See supra note 5, s 13.09(c).
162. Ibid (subsection 13.2(d)-13.2(i) deal with intent, economic benefit, prior warning, history of
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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As noted earlier, “damage” in this context includes loss of use and nonuse value.163
Like the purpose of sentencing clause, this list of aggravating factors serves
primarily to codify the existing common law factors applied in sentencing,164
with the new and important inclusion of use and non-use values in the definition
of environmental damage.
Part and parcel with these provisions are new minimum and higher maximum
fines, different levels of penalties for different types of offenders, and Governor
in Council authority to distinguish, using regulations, between less and more
serious offences that would carry lower and higher fine ranges, respectively.165
For designated serious offences by an individual, a summary conviction carries
a minimum $5,000 and a maximum $300,000 fine, whereas on indictment the
minimum is $15,000 and the maximum is $1 million. For small corporations, a
summary conviction carries a minimum $25,000 and a maximum $2 million fine,
whereas on indictment the minimum is $75,000 and the maximum is $4 million.
For large corporations, a summary conviction carries a minimum $100,000 and
a maximum $4 million fine, whereas on indictment the minimum is $500,000
and the maximum is $6 million.166
Parliament has also uniformly armed judges with the powers necessary to
order what are often referred to as “creative sentences,”167 the most relevant of
which would appear to be the power to order remediation. Thus, under the
CNMCAA, courts may:
in addition to any punishment [fine] imposed … make an order … (b) directing the
person to take any action that the court considers appropriate to remedy or avoid
any damage to any marine conservation area resources that resulted or may result
from the commission of the offence.168

Viewed this way, it might be presumed that Parliament intended for deterrence
and denunciation to be accomplished through fines, with restoration and the
polluter pays principle being achieved through additional orders such as renon-compliance and post-offence conduct). Additionally, subsection 13.1(3) states that the
absence of an aggravating factor is not to be construed as a mitigating factor.
163. Ibid, s 13.1(4).
164. See also Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 110-11.
165. See e.g. CNMCAA, supra note 43, s 16(1)(n). Although the regulation-making authority
here is not as clear as it could be, this power could be considered analogous to the distinction
between Type A and Type B procedures under CERCLA.
166. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, supra note 4 at 6.
167. Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121.
168. CNMCAA, supra note 43, ss 27(1), 27(1)(b).
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mediation. This distinction seems to evaporate, however, in light of the EEA’s
requirement that all fines be directed to Environment Canada’s Environmental
Damages Fund (EDF).169 A sort of ‘Superfund-lite’ the EDF receives money from
civil judgments and regulatory sentences, which it spends on environmental
restoration in the location where the damage occurred or on other projects based
on established criteria.170 In other words, the EDF “follows the Polluter Pays
Principle to help ensure that those who cause environmental damage or harm to
wildlife take responsibility for their actions.”171
On their face, these EEA provisions may seem duplicative. As will be seen
below, however, the power to order remediation and the allocation of all fines to
the EDF (essentially an indirect remediation order) actually ensures a comprehensive scheme for capturing the full range of relevant ecosystem services losses,
both permanent and temporary, actual and potential, and for ensuring that
environmental fines are put to the best use. The only concern will be to avoid
double counting, which could occur where the Crown introduces evidence of
ecosystem service losses and also seeks an order for restoration. In such instances,
the amount of the fine reflecting actual ecosystem service losses (setting aside for
the moment the risk of loss) would be restricted to interim losses, recognizing
that restoration should eventually replace any permanent losses.172 On the other
hand, in the majority of cases where the actual environmental damage and therefore
restoration required is minimal173 but the risk of damage—the potential loss of
ecosystem services—is great, both a restoration order and a significant fine may
be appropriate and would not constitute double counting.
The availability of both restoration orders and the EDF also gives judges the
option of retaining jurisdiction over restoration activities (e.g., where the conduct
169. See CNPA, supra note 148, s 29.1(1); CNMCAA, supra note 43, s 26.1; IRIA, supra note 151,
s 44; CWA, supra note 149, s 13.13; and MBCA, supra note 5, s 13.2.
170. Harry J Wruck, QC, “The Federal Environmental Damages Fund” (2004) 5 CELR (3d)
120 at 120. See also Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121; and Environment Canada, online:
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/edf-fde/default.asp?lang=En&n=A82326FE-1> [EDF Website] (listing
recent cases and corresponding fines).
171. Ibid.
172. The same approach was advanced in Canada, in Canfor, supra note 9 at para 11. The Court
observed:
The Attorney General of Canada intervened in support of the Province to argue that full compensation for damage to protected natural resources must include reimbursement for financial
expenditure on restoring the natural resource (“restoration cost”), compensation for the loss
of use and passive use until such time as restoration is complete (“loss of use”), and, where the
facts warrant, additional compensation for permanent loss of a unique resource where there is
no prospect of restoration.

173. Wruck, supra note 170 at 137.
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of the accused was particularly offensive) or allowing these to be managed by
the EDF. In the latter case, the Crown would simply need to ensure that
the fine requested is sufficient to secure adequate restoration. Such costs could
be introduced as evidence of lost use and non-use values, bearing in mind that
under the American NRDA legislation restoration costs are generally preferred
as an indirect but more transparent method for valuing actual ecosystem services
losses, while in Canada they have been recommended as the presumptive method
for estimating environmental damages.174
1.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA

Before considering the opportunities and challenges for ecosystem servicesbased EDA, it is reasonable to ask whether adoption of the ecosystem services
paradigm—or any kind of valuation framework—is desirable for the purposes
of environmental sentencing. After all, valuation does presume a utilitarian or
instrumental view of the natural world seemingly to the exclusion of other values,
including intrinsic value.175
Whatever one’s position on the utilitarian versus intrinsic value debate with
respect to environmental law and policy generally,176 in the specific context of
the EEA the question appears moot. Parliament clearly signaled its approval for
a utilitarian approach when it included use and non-use values in the definition
of environmental damage. Furthermore, those who might insist on recognizing
the environment’s intrinsic value can find solace in the fact that the use of the
non-exhaustive term “includes” in the definition of environmental damage leaves
room for judges to take intrinsic value into account, should the Crown introduce
evidence of it.

174. See supra note 106-109.
175. For the possible emergence of a non-utilitarian ethic in environmental law, see Demarco,
supra note 160 at 67. According to Professors Karin Mickelson and William Rees, however,
“there is no doubt that environmental protection is understood in instrumental terms …
indeed, it can be said to characterize most current environmental law and policy.” See “The
Environment: Ecological and Ethical Dimensions” in Elaine Hughes, Alastair R Lucas &
William A Tilleman, Environmental Law and Policy, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery,
2003) 1 at 19.
176. On the utilitarian side, there would also seem considerable merit in the position, first
articulated in Nature’s Services, that “economic markets play a dominant role in patterns of
human behavior, and the expression of value—even if imperfect—in a common currency
helps to inform the decision-making process.” See Daily, supra note 25 at 10. For intrinsic
arguments, see e.g. Sagoff, supra note 30.
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i.

Judicial Capacity and the Role of Expert Evidence

Perhaps the most important determinant with respect to the potential for an ecosystem
services approach to EDA is not the inclusion of use and non-use values in the
definition of environmental damages but the Canadian judiciary’s established
appreciation for, and understanding of, technical expert evidence with respect to
environmental harm.
There is little merit in the argument that an ecosystem services approach is
too complex for the purposes of sentencing, as was argued by industry when a
similar approach was proposed for sentencing in the United States in 1993.177
Canadian judges have demonstrated a considerable capacity for understanding
complex ecological principles and processes, often in the context of competing
expert evidence.178 They have understood and written with sophistication about
the perils of acid rain,179 the impacts of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on the ozone
layer (including the importance of cumulative effects)180 the biological persistence
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),181 the impacts of sediment on fish habitat,182
and the fragility of the arctic environment,183 to name only a few examples.
Where lawyers and courts have struggled, understandably, is with the quantification of environmental harm in monetary terms, relying instead where possible
on the principle of parity. In the absence of a standardized metric, however, there
is no guarantee that the first (or “benchmark”) sentence for a given offence reflects
the actual or potential environmental harm that arose in the circumstances,
rendering subsequent sentences essentially arbitrary (at least with respect to this
aggravating factor). Because of its precedential nature, such an approach can
also lead to relatively low fines that do not account for society’s rapidly evolving
177. US, Environmental Protection Agency, An Advisory of the Illegal Competitive Advantage
(ICA) Economic Benefit (EB) Advisory Panel of the EPA Science Advisory Board (EPA-SABADV-05-003) (Washington, DC: US Environmental Protection Agency, 2005) [EPA, An
Advisory] (for a recent reversal in this position). Under current US Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG), for offences involving fish, wildlife, and plants, judges may take into account the
“market value” of lost fish and wildlife or, where no market exists, the costs of restitution,
but are advised to not consider aesthetic values measured through such methods as CV (see
USSG § 2Q2.1).
178. See e.g. R v Procter, 2008 BCSC 19, [2008] BCWLD 1575.
179. See e.g. United Keno Hills, supra note 7 at para 9.
180. R v Canadian Tire Corp, (2004) OTC 668 at paras 57-66, 96, 110, 9 CELR (3d) 248 (OSCJ)
181. R v Chem-Security (Alberta) Ltd, 1998 ABPC 96 at paras 13, 22, 233 AR 289. See also R v
Sinclair (2009), 45 CELR (3d) 222 at para 107-08, CarswellOnt 4894 (WL Can) (OCJ).
182. Northwest Territories, supra note 130 at paras 81-94. See also R v Sutherland, 2010 ONSC 2240,
51 CELR (3d) 163; and R v Brown and Brown, 2005 BCPC 517, [2006] BCWLD 656.
183. R v Iqaluit (City), 2002 CanLII 53331 at para 8 (NU CJ).
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knowledge of and appreciation for the problem of environmental degradation.
Indeed, part of the rationale for the EEA was “a growing understanding of the
extent and severity of the damages that environmental offences can cause, and a
corresponding increase in the demand for more severe penalties and fines … .”184
Both the Carriere and Caseley decisions, on the other hand, indicate a
willingness to consider a different approach. Although the adoption of an ecosystem
services framework would clearly require some capacity building on behalf of
both lawyers and the judiciary, a strengthened capacity to implement environmental law was another factor driving passage of the EEA:
The need for the amendments proposed in the … [EEA] are [sic] clear. At the Global
Judges Symposium held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002, where Canada’s
Supreme Court was represented, the Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law
and Sustainable Development were adopted. The principles include the following
statement:
We are strongly of the view that there is an urgent need to strengthen the
capacity of judges, prosecutors, legislators and all persons who play a critical
role ... in the process of implementation, development and enforcement of
environmental law ... especially through the judicial process ... .185

Stanley Berger suggests:
The endorsement of these principles … [is] worth repeating in hearings involving
the admissibility of evidence and sentencing before trial and appellate courts because
the commitment made is not simply that of a group of academics; it was made by the
judiciary on behalf of the judiciary.186

It should also be noted that in New South Wales, where the framework for
environmental sentencing is essentially identical to Canada’s, the judiciary has

184. Canada, Environment Canada, Backgrounder: Environmental Enforcement Bill, New Penalties
and Sentencing Provisions, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2009), online: Environment
Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=en&n=714D9AAE-1&news=20D9CEF00991-4A6F-A12E-FC132BDF06CA> [Environment Canada].
185. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1823 (Mark Warawa). In the preamble to the
Principles, the Members of the Judiciary emphasized “that the fragile state of the global
environment requires the Judiciary as the guardian of the Rule of Law, to boldly and
fearlessly implement and enforce applicable international and national laws… .” See
The Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law and Sustainable Development adopted at
the Global Judges Symposium held in Johannesburg, South Africa on 18-20 August 2002,
UNEP, (2002), online: UNEP <http://www.unep.org/law/symposium/Principles.htm>
[Johannesburg Principles].
186. Stanley Berger, The Prosecution and Defence of Environmental Offences, vol II (Aurora: Canada
Law Book, 2009) at 7.9.
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already come to recognize that what the Caseley court described as “intangible
losses” are actually externalities—the public costs of environmental or ecosystem
service degradation—which can and should be redressed in sentencing:
Where the commission of an offence results in external costs (environmental, social
or economic) being suffered, these costs contribute to the objective harmfulness of
the offence … . The court may not be able, by its sentence, to capture all of the
external costs … . Nevertheless, the court may properly be able to reflect the external
costs in its sentence and by that means, in part, bring back the external costs to the
offender.187

In the United States there was originally considerable opposition to any
assessment of harm in the enforcement context, and current policies now focus
almost exclusively on recapturing the economic benefits of non-compliance.188
There have nonetheless been calls recently to take environmental harm, and the
loss of ecosystem services specifically, into account in at least some situations.189
Thus, in addition to an established role for expert evidence with respect to environmental harm in the regulatory context in Canada, there is also precedent in other
common law jurisdictions for recognizing and accounting for the public costs of
environmental degradation for the purposes of environmental sentencing.
ii. Furthering the Polluter Pays Principle
As mentioned above, the polluter pays principle suggests that polluters should
bear the costs of the pollution generated by their activities. Among the most
“operationalized” environmental principles in Canada,190 it is also recognized at the
international level, for example in Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (of which Canada is a signatory): “National au-

187. BJ Preston, “Principled sentencing for environmental offences – Part 2: Sentencing
considerations and options” (2007) 31:3 Criminal Law Journal 142.
188. Under the EEA, such benefits are intended to be captured through the imposition of an
additional fine pursuant to section 24.3 of the CNMCAA. For example:
If a person is convicted of an offence under this Act and the court is satisfied that, as a result
of the commission of the offence, the person acquired any property, benefit or advantage, the
court shall order the person to pay an additional fine in an amount equal to the court’s estimation of the value of that property, benefit or advantage. The additional fine may exceed the
maximum amount of any fine that may otherwise be imposed under this Act.

See CNMCAA, supra note 43.
189. EPA, An Advisory, supra note 177 at 2. See also David Markell, “Is There A Possible Role For
Regulatory Enforcement In The Effort To Value, Protect, And Restore Ecosystem Services?”
(2007) 22:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 549 at 549.
190. Demarco, supra note 160 at 64.
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thorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs
and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution … .”191
In the context of the EEA (and of environmental offences generally), the
polluter pays principle is only partially applicable in the sense that most environmental laws authorize the externalization of some environmental harm as the
cost of economic development.192 In this context, application of the polluter pays
principle does not seem intended to capture the full range of externalities (i.e.,
ecosystem services losses) associated with an activity but more specifically those
attributable to the commission of a particular offence because they fall outside
of the bargain struck between governments, the public, and industry in setting
regulatory standards.193
Even in this partial application, however, there is “little practical significance
in the notion that the polluter must pay unless it can be established precisely for
what he must pay and exactly how much it will cost him.”194 It is in this sense, as
a conceptual framework for capturing and organizing environmental values that
may not be immediately obvious, that an ecosystem services approach to EDA
seems particularly appropriate:
Simply listing the services derived from an ecosystem, using the best available
ecological, social, and behavioral sciences, can help ensure appropriate recognition
of the full range of potential ecological responses to a given policy and their effects
on human well-being. It can also help make the analysis of the role of ecosystems
more transparent and accessible.195

A recent controversial proposal by Canadian pipeline company Enbridge
Inc. provides a useful example. Enbridge proposes to construct two pipelines
191. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNEP, 1992, UN Doc E.73.II.A.14,
(1992) at principle 16.
192. See Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 105-06. The authors write: “To the disappointment
of many, environmental law does not have as its focus the end of all environmental harm.
Rather, it is about achieving a balance between the socio-economic benefits of modern
industrial and technological development, and the health and ecological costs that inevitably
accompany such activities.” One of the most prominent federal exceptions to this rule would be
section 5.1 of the MBCA, supra note 5. See Syncrude, supra note 19.
193. For a concrete illustration of this bargain and its occasionally arbitrary results, see Carriere,
supra note 132 at paras 42-43 (Justice Robinson acknowledges, and expresses some sympathy
for, the accused’s comments that while he may be guilty of illegally taking 158 birds, a dam
lawfully operated by the provincial government does far more damage to migratory birds).
194. Michael Bowman, “The Definition and Valuation of Environmental Harm: An Overview” in
Bowman & Boyle, supra note 76, 1 at 1.
195. EPA, supra note 33 at 12.
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running from Alberta to Kitimat, British Columbia, where it would also build
a new marine terminal.196 Of the three proposed marine transportation routes,
one would see oil tankers enter the Hecate Strait via Queen Charlotte Sound.197
Queen Charlotte Sound, in turn, is adjacent to the Gwaii Haanas National Marine
Conservation Area, Canada’s first marine conservation area (MCA) under the
CNMCAA.198 In light of the recent Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico,
which has also stirred memories of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, it is not
surprising that many local First Nations have called for an outright ban on oil
tanker traffic in this area, arguing that a spill would be just a matter of time.199
Should a spill occur within Gwaii Haanas, it could easily constitute an
offence under the CNMCAA.200 Pursuant to subsection 24.7(2), a sentencing judge
would need to consider whether “(a) the offence caused damage or risk of damage
to any marine conservation area resources,” whether this damage was to “(b) …
any unique, rare, particularly important or vulnerable marine conservation area
resources,” and whether it was “(c) … extensive, persistent or irreparable,” where
“damage” includes the loss of use and non-use values.201
A sentencing judge might be inclined, as Justice Robinson did in R v Carriere,
to turn to the relevant legislative framework for “some understanding of what
[MCAs] are worth.”202 As noted in Part I, most environmental laws—including
those amended by the EEA—are replete with references to the more obvious

196. Enbridge, Northern Gateway Pipelines, Project Brochure, vol 4 (Vancouver: Blanchette Press,
2010) at 4.
197. Ibid at 11.
198. See online: Parks Canada <http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-cnnmca/
gwaiihaanas/itm3-/estab3a_e.asp?all=true> [Parks Canada].
199. “Oil tanker traffic ban sought by B.C. groups,” CBC News (30 November 2010), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/11/30/bc-groups-want-ban-on-oiltanker-traffic.html>. While catastrophic spills of that magnitude (nearly 11 million gallons in
the case of the Exxon Valdez) are uncommon, oil spills do happen all over the world. Between
1960 – 1995, there were nearly 1000 spills of at least 10,000 gallons (approximately 37,850
liters) with the greatest number occurring in the Gulf of Mexico (267) and the northeastern
United States. See online: NOAA <http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/faq_topic.php?faq_topic_
id=1#2>. In Canada, oil tankers have been fined between $80,000 and $125,000 for spills
off the coast of Nova Scotia. In fact, it was an oil spill that led to the creation of the EDF. See
Wruck, supra note 170 at 131 and 120, respectively.
200. Supra note 43, s 29(1).
201. Supra note 43.
202. In that case, Justice Robinson referred to provisions of the 1916 Convention and those
contained in an amending Protocol signed by the United States and Canada on 14 December
1995 that signaled the Parties’ reasons for protecting migratory birds, found in a schedule to
the MBCA. See Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 24-25.

166

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

ways in which humans benefit from ecosystems. In the case of the CNMCAA,
Parliament recognized that “the protection of natural, self-regulating marine
ecosystems is important for the maintenance of biological diversity” and that
“the marine environment is fundamental to the social, cultural and economic
well-being of people living in coastal communities … .”203
On their own, such statements say very little about the specific contributions
made by marine environments, making a comprehensive assessment of lost use
and non-use values difficult. Applying the ecosystem services approach, however,
these contributions can be, and have been, catalogued and listed as follows:
•
•

•
•

Provisioning services: food (primarily fish), bulk raw materials,
medicines, and ornamental resources;
Regulating services: nutrient cycling and fertility, air quality and
climate regulation, waste treatment, moderation of extreme events
(e.g. storm protection);
Habitat Services: maintenance of life cycles (nursery); maintenance
of genetic diversity;
Amenity and Cultural Services: recreational services (e.g. ecotourism); inspiration for culture, art and design; and spiritual
experience.204

A similar preliminary listing of services can be made with respect to
national parks and rivers, as well as migratory birds and other wildlife.205 Such
lists would then need to be revised and quantified, applying the various tools
discussed in Part I (e.g., travel cost method, CV, benefit transfer) against the
“hard data” found lacking in Caseley. In the case of the Gwaii Haanas, such data
would include the following:
•

More than 370 thousand pairs of seabirds including tufted puffins,
rhinoceros auklets, ancient and marbled murrelets nest in Gwaii
Haanas [habitat services];

203. Supra note 43 (preamble).
204. See e.g. supra note 53 at ch 18. See also Charles H Peterson & Jane Lubchenco, “Marine
Ecosystem Services” in Daily, supra note 25, 177; and Les Kaufman & Paul Dayton,
“Impacts of Marine Resource Extraction on Ecosystem Services and Sustainability” in Daily,
supra note 25, 275.
205. See Brauman et al, supra note 29 at 72 (with respect to rivers and their related services). With
respect to migratory birds, see the discussion applying the TEEB typology to migratory birds
in the Carriere case in Part II A, above.
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•

•

•

Seventeen species of whales and dolphins including orcas, humpbacks
and grey whales can be seen in the waters of Gwaii Haanas [habitat
and cultural services];
The waters of this MCA support the Haida’s traditional harvest of
marine resources, as well as commercial fisheries including herring
roe-on-kelp (K’aaw), salmon, halibut, rockfish, geoduck clams, and
red sea urchin [provisioning and cultural services];
A large sea lion rookery is located at the southern tip of Gwaii Haanas
at Cape St. James [habitat and cultural services];206

Bearing in mind that valuation is a matter best left to the experts, a recent
study estimated the benefits of marine protected areas in the United Kingdom at
£5.5 to £12.7 billion.207 Similarly (in terms of magnitude and bioregional attributes),
lost non-use values resulting from the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound
were estimated at a minimum of $2.8 billion (US).208 While these figures would
obviously need to be adjusted downward for all but the worst scenarios (e.g.,
using the benefit transfer method), it is clear from the above figures that a spill
even a fraction of that size could result in millions of dollars in lost provisioning,
habitat, and cultural services.
Thus, in addition to furthering the polluter pays principle by ensuring the
comprehensiveness of any EDA, an ecosystem services approach would also render
sentencing more transparent and accessible, both of which should advance the
additional and important goals of uniformity and parity.
iii. Assessing the Risk of Harm
The polluter pays principle is also only partially applicable in the sentencing
context in that it is only relevant to the question of actual as opposed to potential
environmental harm. The courts in Cotton Felts, United Keno Hill, and Kenaston
Drilling all recognized, however, that in many instances the potential environmental
harm, both in the specific circumstances of the offence but also more generally with
regard to the prohibited conduct, is just as relevant to the objective of deterrence
(both specific and general209), if not more so. Such recognition is also reflected in
206. Parks Canada, supra note 198.
207. See S Salman Hussain et al, “An ex ante ecological economic assessment of the benefits
arising from marine protected areas designation in the UK” (2010) 69:4 Ecological Econ 828
at 836-37.
208. Richard T Carson et al, “Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill” (2003) 25:3 Envtl & Resource Econ 257 at 278.
209. See Terroco, supra note 122 at para 53 (“A key component of sentences imposed for breaches
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the EEA. This suggests an even broader role for ecosystem services assessment and
valuation than in the civil liability context, where only actual losses are relevant.
As with actual harm, an ecosystem services approach to the risk of harm
would render it more transparent, comprehensive, and objective. Its probabilistic
nature also highlights the distinction, noted at the outset of this Part, between
civil and regulatory liability. In the civil liability context, the goal of EDA (or
NRDA in the United States) is compensation, and ecosystem services valuation
is carried out to quantify the extent of loss as precisely as possible. In the
sentencing context, where EDA is being carried out to quantify the gravity of the
aggravating factor (in this case, the risk of damage) with a primary view towards
deterrence, whether general or specific or both, judges would seem to have more
flexibility. Evidence with respect to the value of ecosystem goods and services
associated with the area or conduct in question could then serve as a guidepost
for the risk of harm, rather than as a strict determinant.
Suppose, for example, that a corporation released a toxic substance contrary
to section 95 of CEPA, 1999 in the vicinity of the Credit River, near Toronto,
and the evidence showed that while the actual release was relatively limited, the
accused’s conduct created a considerable risk of a much greater release. Suppose
further that the Crown introduced expert evidence that the Credit River watershed
provides more than $371 million in ecosystem services to area residents every
year.210 A sentencing judge would then have an objective guidepost in assessing
the risk of harm caused by the accused, bearing in mind several other factors,
including the nature, location, and duration of the prohibited conduct and its
potential to cause ecosystem service losses.
As another example, this time with a view towards general deterrence, the
Court in R v Carriere observed that while the illegal taking of 159 ducks had no
significant impact on the duck populations of either the Cumberland Marshes or
North America as a whole,
[t]he sustained health of North America’s wild duck population depends on the
co-operation of the governments and peoples of three different countries-Canada,
the U.S. and Mexico. That co-operation is not just restricted to the regulation of
sport hunting, but regulation of sport hunting is key to maintaining duck populations.
… If every hunter took the view that he could double his legal limit, the annual
of environmental protection statutes should be specific and general deterrence”). See also R
v Sapp, 2005 BCPC 166 at para 9, [2005] BCWLD 3945. “It must be recognized that even
if there had been little or no actual harm … there would still have been harm done to the
processes designed to regulate and generally manage the environment and natural resources”
(ibid at para 16).
210. Pembina Institute, supra note 144 at 1.
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duck hunt would potentially result in 30 million ducks killed. Perhaps the ducks
could take this pressure for a short while. However, as the examples of the passenger
pigeon and the whooping crane illustrate, sustained overhunting would likely lead
to devastation.
Of course, one person breaking the law will not necessarily cause everyone to follow suit … [b]ut the potential exists for one person’s breaches to encourage an ever
widening disregard for the rule of law.211

As noted above, Justice Robinson was “left to assume that ducks have a
significant value … without having any precise figure for what that value might
be.”212 It is possible, however, to assess the economic value of particular species,
as has been done recently for polar bears213 and Atlantic salmon.214 The value of
the former was estimated at over $6 billion per year, primarily as a reflection of
non-use values. In the sentencing context, such figures can provide an objective
benchmark against which the risk of harm can be measured.
iv. The Potential for Higher Fines
As the above examples suggest, an ecosystem services approach to environmental
sentencing has the potential to increase—perhaps even significantly—the size of
the fines imposed by judges. It is relevant, then, that in passing the EEA, Parliament
clearly intended environmental offences to attract higher fines:
Current fines are too low to be effective deterrents. Furthermore, they do not
adequately express society’s strong disapproval of environmental offences. …
To put this in perspective, we need to consider that penalties for environmental offences in the United States often reach millions of dollars. Bill C-16 would address
this issue by providing guidance to the courts in appropriate fines for introducing
minimum fines, requiring courts to consider aggravating factors and increasing most
of the minimum and maximum fines [sic].215

211. Carriere, supra note 132 at paras 46-47.
212. Ibid at para 27.
213. “What is the price of a polar bear?” CBC News (17 December 2010), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/12/17/pricing-polar-bears.html>. See
Environment Canada, Evidence of the Socio-Economic Importance of Polar Bears for
Canada by ÉcoRessources Consultants (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2011) (final report).
214. Charlene MacKenzie, “Study tracks true value of salmon; Research Miramichi one of
four rivers looked at to determine impact of fishing industry,” Telegraph-Journal (20 June
2011) A1, online: Telegraph-Journal <http://telegraphjournal.canadaeast.com/front/
article/1416596>.
215. House of Commons Debates, supra note 2 at 1823 (Mark Warawa). These increases would seem
to bring Canadian penalties within the same range as many American ones: see Markell,
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All other things being equal, this means that an offence that would have
previously merited a $50,000 fine should be met with a higher fine, post-EEA.
Of course, setting a fine is a multifaceted exercise and environmental damage
(and the risk thereof ) is only one, albeit important, aggravating factor. But if one
of the drivers motivating the higher fine regime was a growing understanding of
the extent and severity of the damages that environmental offences can cause,216
then an ecosystem services approach—whose very reason for being is to reveal
the numerous, often hidden ways in which ecosystems contribute to societal
well-being—is especially well-suited for achieving such higher fines in a manner
that is fair and, as noted by the EPA-SAB, transparent and accessible.
The availability of higher fines should also change the cost-benefit analysis
with respect to the appropriateness of carrying out ecosystem services assessment
and valuation. That the cost of valuation can deter parties from carrying it out is
widely recognized, including in Canada.217 As discussed in Part I, this reality has
led to the creation of several low-cost methods for assessing harm pursuant to
CERCLA Type A procedures and as developed by several states. Such tools would
be welcome for minor offences in the Canadian regulatory context as well, but
where the actual damage is significant or where the evidence establishes a risk
of significant environmental damage, the costs of ecosystem services assessment
and valuation might be offset by the potential for a higher fine. And while the
EEA—in contrast to CERCLA—is silent with respect to the costs of assessment
as a component of environmental damage, it seems to leave room for the Crown
to seek a recommendation from the court that portions of any EDF-destined fine
be used to reimburse the government for assessment costs already incurred.218
Alternatively, bearing in mind the funding structure of the EDF,219 the Crown
might be able to introduce a preliminary assessment of damages and a relatively
comprehensive estimate of the costs of a more detailed assessment and restoration,
which would then be available for those purposes through the EDF.220
supra note 189 at 561. Markell writes:
Under many of the significant regulatory statutes, EPA can impose substantial penalties — up
to $32,500 per day, per violation. … If the regulated party has committed three different
violations of the Clean Water Act for a month, the total maximum potential penalty increases
to $2,925,000 ($975,000 x three).

See Environment Canada, supra note 184.
See Elgie & Lintner, supra note 15 at 256-57.
See e.g. CNPA, supra note 148, s 29.1(2).
The EDF does not appear to distinguish between assessment costs and the costs of
restoration: see EDF website, supra note 170 (under “Potential Applicants”).
220. But see Wruck, supra note 170 at 134. He observes, “An area where polluters have in the past
been highly suspicious of government is in the field of environmental research. One common
216.
217.
218.
219.
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v.

The Environmental Damages Fund

The EDF directs funds, received as a result of fines, to projects that benefit the
environment in the geographic region where the original incident occurred.
Although priority is given to restoration projects, other projects that “develop
environmental damage assessment and restoration methods including techniques
for the valuation of damage” are given equal consideration in cases where little or
no actual damage has occurred.221
The literature is replete with references to data limitations, especially with
respect to baseline conditions.222 Professor David Markell argues that the use
of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) and other enforcement tools to
fill these gaps would enable the EPA “to shift the burden of doing much of this
ecosystem-beneficial work to the regulated community. … Enforcement offers
an opportunity for environmental progress and new learning that, quite simply,
is not likely to occur if it were dependent entirely on government resources and
initiatives.”223
The direction of fines to the EDF—especially in those instances where there is
little actual damage but the risk of ecosystem services losses warrants a significant
fine—presents a similar opportunity. This opportunity takes on additional
significance in light of the Canadian government’s commitment, included in
its first legislatively-mandated sustainable development strategy, to develop and
apply models for ecosystem services valuation by 2015.224 In addition to facilitating
the gathering of baseline data, such work could examine recent recommendations
made in the United States regarding the development of “ecosystem service
assessment endpoints” for the purposes of ecological risk assessment.225 ERA is
a fundamental part of the remediation process under CERCLA for sites that are
so contaminated that they qualify for Superfund moneys and can be remediated without awaiting a trial award. As noted in Part I, ecosystem services have
been advanced as a “common currency” that could facilitate the integration of

221.
222.
223.
224.

225.

complaint is that the monies are often needlessly spent by government scientists attempting
to engage in research for the purpose of pursuing their own pet projects.”
EDF Website, supra note 170 (under “Potential Applicants”).
Markell, supra note 189 at 571-72. For a Canadian example, see Nature Conservancy of
Canada, supra note 36 at 26.
Markell, supra note 189 at 554.
Canada, Sustainable Development Office, Planning For A Sustainable Future: A Federal
Sustainable Development Strategy For Canada (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2010) at 55
[Sustainable Development Office].
Munns Jr et al, supra note 33 at 502.
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ERA and damages assessment.226 Such research would be particularly relevant
for certain departments, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and
Environment Canada, which often order remedial work through administrative
powers prior to taking enforcement action.227 Qualifying research would also
include further research into the various tools discussed in Part I (including HEA
and benefit transfer), as well as the emerging concept of ecological production
function (EPF), which describes “the relationships between the structure and
function of ecosystems, on the one hand, and the provision of various ecosystems
services, on the other.”228
2.

CHALLENGES FACING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-BASED EDA

Perhaps the most obvious objection to ecosystem services-based EDA is that neither
the EEA nor any of the statutes that it amends make any reference to that term.
Although such a reference would be welcome, its omission should not be viewed
as excluding it. As a conceptual framework accompanied with a set of methodologies, ecosystem services-based EDA is merely the means by which lawyers and
judges can accomplish the more important and legislatively determined end (i.e.,
the consideration of lost use and non-use values), considering that Parliament
understandably expressed no view as to the manner by which this should be
accomplished. It is also worth recalling that the regulations under CERCLA and
OPA rely on the concept of ecosystem services notwithstanding the absence of
this term from either statute, and further that these schemes represent the gold
standard for natural resource damages assessment and valuation.
Constitutional questions and the uncertain prospect of enforcement are
more serious obstacles to ecosystem services-based EDA in Canada.
i.

Constitutionality

The EEA’s damage provisions are likely to be challenged on constitutional
grounds as an encroachment on the provinces’ civil jurisdiction over property
and civil rights.229 Such a challenge is unlikely to succeed. The analysis is complicated
226. Ibid at 501.
227. Hughes & Reynolds, supra note 121 at 116.
228. EPA, supra note 33 at 30. The report also suggests that “[t]hese functions capture the
biophysical relationships between ecological systems and the services they provide, as well
as the inter-related processes and functions, such as sequestration, predation, and nutrient
cycling” (ibid at 30). See also NRC Report, supra note 51 at 3.
229. See R v Zelensky, [1978] 2 SCR 940, 86 DLR (3d) 179. See also House of Commons Debates,
40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 31 (23 March 2009) at 1827 (David McGuinty). McGuinty stated:
“The court may indeed order compensation and restoration payments. I believe there will
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somewhat by the fact that the EEA’s environmental damage provisions are not
part of a statutorily authorized compensation or civil liability scheme but rather
are subsumed in a list of aggravating factors within a fine regime. Nevertheless, a
future accused facing a large fine is likely to emphasize the civil liability character
of these provisions and argue substance over form. Both CERCLA and the OPA
are civil liability schemes, after all.
Even if the EDA provisions are considered tantamount to an authorized
compensation or civil liability scheme, they are unlikely to be found ultra vires.
Subsection 42(3) of the federal Fisheries Act, discussed in Part II (which attaches
liability for losses resulting from a deposit of deleterious substances), was challenged
unsuccessfully on such grounds in Gagnier and Hope Point Fishing Company Ltd v
Canadian Forest Products Ltd.230 Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing,231 the court applied the
following three-part test:
[F]irst, a determination of whether the impugned provision does encroach on provincial powers; second, in a case like the present one, a determination of whether it is a
valid part of a regulatory scheme; and third, if the scheme is valid, a determination
of whether the impugned provision is “sufficiently integrated” with or “functionally
related” to the scheme.232

Although a detailed exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this
article, it seems clear that no serious challenge could be made to the damage
provisions of those EEA-amended statutes that deal with federal lands, whether
national parks or marine conservation areas. As for the others, the damage provisions
of each statute are tailored to the attribute of the environment that is the subject
of federal jurisdiction. For example, the relevant provisions of the MBCA are not
concerned with the environment generally, but with the loss of use and non-use
values associated with migratory birds and their nests.233 Such provisions seem

230.
231.
232.

233.

be questions about constitutionality.” Readers should note that such a challenge would be
to the EDA provisions of the EEA generally, and would not be specific to an ecosystem
services approach.
(1990), 51 BCLR (2d) 218, 23 ACWS (3d) 1040 (BCSC) [Gagnier].
[1989] 1 SCR 641, 58 DLR (4th) 255 [General Motors].
Gagnier, supra note 230 at 225. Readers may be interested to know that Mr. Gagnier was
ultimately unsuccessful in his action. Agreeing with defence council that “Mr. Gagnier …
will lie when it is to his economic advantage to do so,” the Court felt “bound to disregard
Mr. Gagnier’s evidence altogether insofar as it touches on his claim for damages. Without his
evidence, the … claims for damages must fail.” See Gagnier v Canadian Forest Products Ltd,
1991 CanLII 143 at 17-18 (BCSC).
Supra note 5, s 13.1.
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sufficiently integrated and functionally related to the protection of migratory
birds to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
ii. Enforcement and Implementation
A greater uncertainty with respect to ecosystem services-based EDA, or any EDA
for that matter, is the likelihood of implementation and enforcement. As noted
by Professor David Boyd, “[o]n paper, Canada has many seemingly impressive
environmental laws. In practice, key elements of these laws are rarely, if ever,
implemented.”234 While this issue was raised by several MPs during the debate
on the EEA, perhaps the clearest statement of the problem was made by Bloc
Quebecois MP Bernard Bigras:
It is all well and good to want to change the fine structure, but the current laws
must be enforced. I have been a member of this House since 1997, and I have seen a
number of environmental laws enacted in Canada… But the fact is that we lack the
resources to enforce these acts. We can give officers more power, but there are very
few officers on the ground to enforce the law.235

Although EC, and its Atlantic region in particular, already have a recognized
capacity to conduct EDA,236 they do not appear to have the same kind of institutional support as their American counterparts (e.g., the NOAA’s DARRP). The
Conservative government’s 2008 budget allocated an additional $21 million to
EC over two years for the implementation of the stricter enforcement regime that
the EEA was expected to bring,237 but it will take several years before an increase
in enforcement, if any, will be measurable. In the meantime, recent reports by the
federal Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development and
Ecojustice suggest an opposite trend.238

III. CONCLUSION
Justice Binnie, writing for the majority in Canfor, observed that “[if ] justice is to be
done to the environment, it will often fall to the Attorney General, invoking both
234. David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 237.
235. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 2d Sess, No 33 (25 March 2009) at 1943 (Bernard Bigras).
236. Wruck, supra note 170 at 138.
237. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, supra note 4 at 35.
238. See Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2011 December Report of the
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor
General, 2011), online: Office of the Auditor General <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/
English/parl_cesd_201112_e_36027.html>.
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statutory and common law remedies, to protect the public interest.”239 Canfor was
an example of the latter kind of remedy. While the Attorney General for British
Columbia was ultimately unsuccessful, the Court’s decision was widely received
as having increased the potential for the common law “to assist in the realization
of the fundamental value of environmental protection.”240
Environmental sentencing in the post-EEA world is an example of the former
kind of remedy mentioned by Justice Binnie. The inclusion of lost use and non-use
values within the definition of environmental damage should similarly be viewed
as having increased the potential of federal environmental legislation to assist in
achieving that same important goal. In order to realize this potential, however,
any assessment of environmental damages, including potential damages, must
be as comprehensive as possible and must not overlook the numerous, often
hidden ways through which the environment, or natural capital, sustains
human well-being and prosperity. This was and continues to be the impetus for
ecosystem services research, which is why this article explored the potential for
ecosystem services-based EDA.
There are several factors favoring the incorporation of an ecosystem services
approach to EDA. These include the Canadian judiciary’s existing approach to
environmental sentencing (particularly the established role of expert evidence in
determining harm), the incorporation of restoration and the polluter pays principle
as objectives in sentencing, the recognized importance of the risk of harm in
achieving deterrence, the higher fine regime, and finally, the flexibility and
efficiencies gained by directing fines to the EDF.
A useful first step in this direction would be to begin gathering necessary
baseline information. It should be relatively easy, for example, to assess and then
update periodically the ecosystem services provided by Canada’s national parks
and marine conservation areas. This information would undoubtedly be useful
for some federal government departments independent of its potential future
use in prosecuting offences.241 As noted, it is also possible to assess the economic
value of particular species. Once conducted, such assessments could be applied in
multiple cases, instead of undertaking separate valuations in each case. Such efforts
could thus result in considerable cost savings, with implications for the cost-benefit
analysis of ecosystem services assessment and valuation discussed above.
239. Canfor, supra note 9 at para 8.
240. Ibid at para 155.
241. One might reasonably assume that Parks Canada or DFO would be the principal parties
interested in such valuation, which could then be provided to the Public Prosecution Service
of Canada (PPSC).
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Ecosystem services may not be an environmental law and policy panacea, but
a “[f ]ailure to refine our understanding of their value, and the consequent inability
to account for those values … is unlikely to promote their conservation.”242 This
sentiment, directed towards regulatory and market settings, seems equally
applicable to environmental sentencing. Accounting for ecosystem services losses
in this latter context would be an ambitious project, and would require a
clear commitment on the part of both the federal government and the judiciary.
As noted, however, Canada has already committed to developing and applying
models for ecosystem services valuation243 and members of its judiciary have
committed “to boldly and fearlessly implement and enforce” its environmental
laws.244 Considering also that such an approach would facilitate the understanding,
protection, and restoration of ecosystem services in other contexts,245 the case for
ecosystem services in environmental sentencing is overwhelming.
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Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 24 at 31.
Sustainable Development Office, supra note 224.
Johannesburg Principles, supra note 185.
Markell, supra note 189 at 572.

